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Re: [sunset4] Last Call: <draft-ietf-behave-lsn-requirements-07.txt> (Common requirements for Carrier Grade NATs (CGNs)) to Best Current Practice

Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Wed, 11 July 2012 16:46 UTC

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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: Simon Perreault <simon.perreault@viagenie.ca>
Subject: Re: [sunset4] Last Call: <draft-ietf-behave-lsn-requirements-07.txt> (Common requirements for Carrier Grade NATs (CGNs)) to Best Current Practice
References: <DCC302FAA9FE5F4BBA4DCAD4656937791745903045@PRVPEXVS03.corp.twcable.com> <4FF8A836.2090407@viagenie.ca> <DCC302FAA9FE5F4BBA4DCAD4656937791745A1F0D4@PRVPEXVS03.corp.twcable.com> <4FFAF400.1030201@viagenie.ca> <1DF204BC-FAD6-4A0E-90B0-64760CC1ECF9@huawei.com> <4FFD8727.4020207@viagenie.ca>
Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2012 12:47:16 -0400
In-Reply-To: <4FFD8727.4020207@viagenie.ca> (Simon Perreault's message of "Wed, 11 Jul 2012 10:01:11 -0400")
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Cc: "behave@ietf.org" <behave@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "sunset4@ietf.org" <sunset4@ietf.org>, Tina TSOU <Tina.Tsou.Zouting@huawei.com>
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Hi. I'd like to speak in favor of maintaining endpoint independent
filtering as the default and maintaining requirement 11 D.  I think
requirement 11 D is important for avoiding some hard to analyze but
potentially very dangerous security problems. If I can trick a NAT into
replacing an existing mapping by causing resource exhaustion then I
could probably attack that.  Unfortunately such attacks tend to appear
minor or hard to exploit until someone puts together what turns out to
be a fairly reliable exploit against some equipment, then you have a
real mess.

I believe the stability of application argument argues for endpoint
independent filtering.

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