Re: Last Call: draft-cheshire-dnsext-multicastdns (Multicast DNS) to Informational RFC

Dave Cridland <dave@cridland.net> Thu, 26 November 2009 11:38 UTC

Return-Path: <dave@cridland.net>
X-Original-To: ietf@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD3243A6BBC for <ietf@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 26 Nov 2009 03:38:40 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 23HPTcGtgDel for <ietf@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 26 Nov 2009 03:38:39 -0800 (PST)
Received: from peirce.dave.cridland.net (peirce.dave.cridland.net [217.155.137.61]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78CDF3A69C6 for <ietf@ietf.org>; Thu, 26 Nov 2009 03:38:39 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by peirce.dave.cridland.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 008ED2F0002; Thu, 26 Nov 2009 11:38:31 +0000 (GMT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at peirce.dave.cridland.net
Received: from peirce.dave.cridland.net ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (peirce.dave.cridland.net [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id pTCo4g9t9HJ8; Thu, 26 Nov 2009 11:38:30 +0000 (GMT)
Received: from puncture (puncture.local [IPv6:2001:838:378:0:221:85ff:fe3f:1696]) by peirce.dave.cridland.net (Postfix) with ESMTPA id A8AEB2F0001; Thu, 26 Nov 2009 11:38:29 +0000 (GMT)
Subject: Re: Last Call: draft-cheshire-dnsext-multicastdns (Multicast DNS) to Informational RFC
References: <4B0CFE61.2070206@nlnetlabs.nl> <4B0E4A49.1070608@nlnetlabs.nl>
In-Reply-To: <4B0E4A49.1070608@nlnetlabs.nl>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <18615.1259235509.636713@puncture>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2009 11:38:29 +0000
From: Dave Cridland <dave@cridland.net>
To: "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@NLnetLabs.nl>, IETF-Discussion <ietf@ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; delsp="yes"; charset="us-ascii"; format="flowed"
X-BeenThere: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <ietf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2009 11:38:40 -0000

On Thu Nov 26 09:28:41 2009, W.C.A. Wijngaards wrote:
> * It may be prudent to have in conflict resolution a line that says  
> that
> if repeated conflicted announcements of unique records are observed  
> by
> another host, then the host SHOULD consider itself to have lost (and
> rename itself).  Or put differently: if a particular host on the  
> network
> keeps causing conflicts, get out of the way, even if the spec says  
> you
> should have won, because this avoids packet-chatter on the network.

Wouldn't this lead to a potential attack by deliberately introducing  
a conflict and taking over a name? Currently, it's possible to take  
over a name by advertising, for example, an A record for a name with  
a higher IP address - since you can easily advertise a name with an  
arbitarily high IP address, this is fairly easy to do, but it'd be  
far simpler just to ignore the probe protcol entirely, as that leads  
to a more seamless takeover of a particular name in most  
circumstances.

Of course, DNSSEC might help here, but presumes that either a  
participant has the ability to sign RRs online, or else is a silent  
partner with a preconfigured trust anchor. (In general, I find the  
comments in the document about DNSSEC somewhat hand-wavy, but I admit  
I lack much knowledge about DNSSEC). Still, if all participants have  
access to the private key for DNSSEC, that provides a significant  
number of possible attack points, I'd have thought - I'm assuming  
here that things like your network printer need to be configured with  
the private key, which may not be the case.

Dave.
-- 
Dave Cridland - mailto:dave@cridland.net - xmpp:dwd@dave.cridland.net
  - acap://acap.dave.cridland.net/byowner/user/dwd/bookmarks/
  - http://dave.cridland.net/
Infotrope Polymer - ACAP, IMAP, ESMTP, and Lemonade