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Re: [Ilc] Welcome to the ILC list

Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> Fri, 17 February 2017 20:43 UTC

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From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
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Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2017 12:43:44 -0800
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To: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
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Cc: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>, David Mazieres expires 2017-05-14 PDT <mazieres-55gj72eaqw2pcqj8rgxsi8nvz2@temporary-address.scs.stanford.edu>, ilc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ilc] Welcome to the ILC list
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> This is not true. See RFC 4033, 4034 and 4035.

RFC 6797 would have been a better choice as TLS is what actually secures DNS, and DNSSEC/DANE are a joke [1], but even HSTS wouldn't help you because almost no one uses it, including apple.com <http://apple.com/> [2].

[1] https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain/blob/master/docs/Comparison.md#dnssec <https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain/blob/master/docs/Comparison.md#dnssec>
[2] https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=apple.com&s=17.178.96.59&latest <https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=apple.com&s=17.178.96.59&latest>

- Greg

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

> On Feb 17, 2017, at 5:58 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr <mailto:bortzmeyer@nic.fr>> wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 12:14:29PM -0800,
> Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com <mailto:contact@taoeffect.com>> wrote
> a message of 246 lines which said:
> 
>> For this reason, it is also not secure. Anyone who can MITM a
>> network connection, can override apple.com <http://apple.com/> <http://apple.com/ <http://apple.com/>>
> 
> The domain name or the URL (sorry for being picky but I find strange
> that people on an IETF mailing list confuse the two)?
> 
>> to be anything they want, along with any other name in the insecure,
> 
> This is not true. See RFC 4033, 4034 and 4035.

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