Re: Comments on draft-bagnulo-multiple-hash-cga-01 (was Re: [Int-area] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-bagnulo-multiple-hash-cga-01.txt)

marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es> Fri, 13 October 2006 09:45 UTC

Received: from [127.0.0.1] (helo=stiedprmman1.va.neustar.com) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1GYJbw-0001Mf-8L; Fri, 13 Oct 2006 05:45:48 -0400
Received: from [10.91.34.44] (helo=ietf-mx.ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1GYJbu-0001MS-QQ for int-area@ietf.org; Fri, 13 Oct 2006 05:45:46 -0400
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es ([163.117.136.122]) by ietf-mx.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1GYJbs-0001CB-5m for int-area@ietf.org; Fri, 13 Oct 2006 05:45:46 -0400
Received: from smtp02.uc3m.es (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by localhost.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 22270A4F37; Fri, 13 Oct 2006 11:45:43 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from [163.117.82.232] (unknown [163.117.82.232]) by smtp02.uc3m.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDC09A4F2F; Fri, 13 Oct 2006 11:45:42 +0200 (CEST)
In-Reply-To: <452F46F2.40407@tm.uka.de>
References: <40dc605df2956ceedc6e48599d336482@it.uc3m.es> <452BE0FB.5000602@tm.uka.de> <794a8143ab6a46b4575fcd74c41fe7ad@it.uc3m.es> <452DF512.20001@tm.uka.de> <45f114e2f7cdcedf4e633e34c96a04d0@it.uc3m.es> <452E1BDE.1000303@tm.uka.de> <fdadf8d3ac68a522e2bbc2a14a32fe54@it.uc3m.es> <452F46F2.40407@tm.uka.de>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v624)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"; format="flowed"
Message-Id: <14256f0b90f06511c3ae624422f5c176@it.uc3m.es>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
Subject: Re: Comments on draft-bagnulo-multiple-hash-cga-01 (was Re: [Int-area] Fwd: I-D ACTION:draft-bagnulo-multiple-hash-cga-01.txt)
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 11:45:56 +0200
To: Christian Vogt <chvogt@tm.uka.de>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.624)
X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/)
X-Scan-Signature: 41c17b4b16d1eedaa8395c26e9a251c4
Cc: Mark Doll <doll@tm.uka.de>, INT Area <int-area@ietf.org>
X-BeenThere: int-area@lists.ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF Internet Area Mailing List <int-area.lists.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area>, <mailto:int-area-request@lists.ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www1.ietf.org/pipermail/int-area>
List-Post: <mailto:int-area@lists.ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:int-area-request@lists.ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area>, <mailto:int-area-request@lists.ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Errors-To: int-area-bounces@lists.ietf.org

El 13/10/2006, a las 9:57, Christian Vogt escribió:

>> the second and the third paragraph in section 3.1. describes how a
>> downgrading attack would work and the rest of the section presents
>> different approachs that would not be vulnerable to those attacks and
>>  selects one among them. Do you think that more text is needed about
>> downgrading attack?
>
> Hi Marcelo,
>
> actually, I do, because the conclusion from the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs
> in section 3.1 is that downgrading can be prevented by encoding the 
> hash
> function into the CGA (rather than specifying it as part of the CGA
> parameters).  But this is true only under the assumption that no two
> encodings can be valid at the same time.
>
> You may say that this is a matter of course (which I actually do agree
> with).  But it may not be so obvious for everyone who reads the 
> document
> or even writes the CGA software.  It's my personal feeling that the
> document should explicitly mention that CGA implementations must always
> be limited to a single meaning per Sec value.
>

ok i see your point and i don't have a strong preference w.r.t. 
including or not including a comment about this issue.

If anyone else has an opinion on this it would be nice to hear about it.


Regards, marcelo


> Regards,
> - Christian
>
> -- 
> Christian Vogt, Institute of Telematics, Universitaet Karlsruhe (TH)
> www.tm.uka.de/~chvogt/pubkey/
>
>
>
> marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>> El 12/10/2006, a las 12:41, Christian Vogt escribió:
>>
>>> Hmm, the document first describes the deficiencies of today's CGA
>>> and then provides a solution.  The Security Considerations section
>>> typically discusses any remaining security issues with the
>>> solution, or it explains why a typical threat that people might be
>>> concerned about does not apply.  Since downbidding is such a
>>> typical threat, I thought that the Security Considerations should
>>> explain why the proposed solution is not vulnerable to it.  But
>>> it's totally fine if you put the explanation elsewhere if that
>>> works better with the current draft structure.
>>
>> the second and the third paragraph in section 3.1. describes how a
>> downgrading attack would work and the rest of the section presents
>> different approachs that would not be vulnerable to those attacks and
>>  selects one among them. Do you think that more text is needed about
>> downgrading attack?
>>
>> Regards, marcelo
>
>
>


_______________________________________________
Int-area mailing list
Int-area@lists.ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area