[ippm] Deb Cooley's No Objection on draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data-integrity-19: (with COMMENT)

[Deb Cooley via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Deb Cooley has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data-integrity-19: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Update:  Thank you very much for addressing my concerns.  I'm leaving the
comments below for historical reasons.

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Thanks to Ben Kaduk for their (multiple) secdir reviews.

I support Gunter's discuss, and his general comment about implementations (or
the lack of).

I support Eric's discuss, especially the part about the ICV occurring before
the data.  That doesn't lead to a nice flow through the system, does it?  I'm
curious as to why it was architected that way.

Section 5:  This is more for Eric V than the authors, per se.  AES-GMAC
provides data origin authentication, which can also be called 'source
integrity'.  While the tags are called authentication tags, they provide the
ability to determine if the data being processed has been modified - data
integrity.  Using the term integrity protection is perfect.