[IPsec] Some comments to the draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-01.txt
Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> Tue, 06 February 2018 17:34 UTC
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Date: Tue, 06 Feb 2018 19:34:46 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2@ietf.org
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Subject: [IPsec] Some comments to the draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-01.txt
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While approving the IANA expert request for this document I noticed some things that might require some fixes to the draft: -- In section 1.1 (which will be removed) there is typo in PPK_SUUPORT. -- In section 3 it would be better to use the same format than what is used in the RFC7296 when using notify payloads with data in it, i.e. replace N(PPK_IDENTITY)(PPK_ID) with N(PPK_IDENTITY, PPK_ID) (see example use in RFC7296 section 2.8.1 or RFC5685). -- In section 4 there is text saying: If the responder has not been upgraded and properly configured, they will both realize it, and in that case, the link will be quantum secure. I think there is something wrong with that. If the responder is not upgraded, then link will not be quantum safe. Same if it is not properly configured. I think it is trying to say that "If the responder has been upgraded and ..." -- In appendix A there is text saying: By limiting our changes to notifications, and translating the nonces, it is hoped that this would be implementable, even on systems that perform much of the IKEv2 processing is in hardware. I think the text "translating the nonces" is leftover from old design and should be changed to reflect the fact that this now changes the SK_d, SK_pi and SK_pr. -- kivinen@iki.fi
- [IPsec] Some comments to the draft-ietf-ipsecme-q… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] Some comments to the draft-ietf-ipsec… Valery Smyslov