Re: [Ipsec] Comments about draft-solinas-ui-suites-00

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Fri, 15 December 2006 18:42 UTC

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Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2006 13:42:54 -0500
To: Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com, ipsec@ietf.org
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Subject: Re: [Ipsec] Comments about draft-solinas-ui-suites-00
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Pasi:

As you have already seen on this list, Scott Kelly is working on an 
update to draft-kelly-ipsec-ciph-sha2.  Once that is done, a 
reference will be added.  I hope to progress the two documents at the 
same time.  This should resolve comments 1) and 2).

As for comment 3), the authors acknowledge that you have a good 
point.  However, they prefer SHA-384 over SHA-512 because SHA-384 is 
a Suite B algorithm and SHA-512 is not.  Moreover, if the user is 
also using ECDSA-384 digital signatures, then he will need to have 
SHA-384 anyway.

Russ


>A couple of minor comments about this draft:
>
>1) The document needs a reference to draft-kelly-ipsec-ciph-sha2,
>which specifies how to use SHA-256 with IPsec.
>
>2) Currently draft-kelly-ipsec-ciph-sha2 specifies only SHA-256
>based integrity/PRF algorithms, but not SHA-384 or SHA-512, so
>"Suite-B-GCM-256" and "Suite-B-GMAC-256" are not actually
>implementable using currently existing documents.
>
>3) Given that SHA-384 is basically SHA-512 truncated to 384 bits
>(and with different IV), do we really need e.g. a SHA-384 based
>PRF for IKEv2? Wouldn't it be simpler just to use SHA-512?
>(There are applications where using SHA-384 may make sense, but
>I'm not sure IKEv2 PRF is one of them...)
>
>Best regards,
>Pasi


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