Re: [IPsec] draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-01

"Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Sat, 20 February 2016 15:12 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
To: Valery Smyslov <svanru@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2016 07:12:53 -0800
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-01
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<no hat>

Your proposal of using heuristics from the SA payload instead of using a 
new registry seems like a bad tradeoff. It costs nothing to create a new 
registry. Further, the code that implementers need to write to use the 
new registered value is smaller *and more definitive* than the code 
needed to use your proposed heuristics.

As for your prediction that AES support might be removed from some CPUs 
in the future: that seems particularly unlikely. Basically, you never 
see CPU features removed from a product line. You sometimes see new 
families of low-end CPUs designed without all the features of current 
CPUs, but even that would not be a negative here. Further, if we need 
algorithms beyond AES in the future, it seems really likely that a 
competition for a replacement would favor one that could re-use the AES 
support in current chips.

I think a small registry for the (hopefully) few developers who care 
about QR a decade before anyone thinks there is any possibility of its 
use is a reasonable way forward.

--Paul Hoffman