Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt

Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io> Tue, 30 November 2021 19:42 UTC

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From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 14:42:00 -0500
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To: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, Harold Liu <harold.liu@ericsson.com>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-rekey-redundant-sas-00.txt
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On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 8:21 AM Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Thank you all for the comments. I believe there is a misunderstanding of
> the resource issue we are facing, so please find below a more detailed
> description.
>
> The resource in question is neither related to the CPU nor the memory, nor
> the bandwidth as comments seem to suggest but instead related to the number
> of table entries that perform the IPsec processing that varies between 720
> to 4000 depending on the hardware chip.
>

Okay.


Randomizing the SA lifetime is a probabilistic approach we - and our
customers - do not want to rely on even if the probability of collision
decreases with the SA lifetime.

So now I am a bit confused. If you are mostly concerned able table length,
then 1 double IPsec SA won't hurt you, but 4000 will. So removing a random
percentage amount of seconds from the initiator would actually
probabilistic fix your issue. 4000 connections with a lifetime of 3600s,
that all start at the same time with a 20% fuzz on initiator would cause
you an extra 5 or 6 SAs. If your code recognises the new SA traffic, and
there is frequent traffic, these double SAs would go away in seconds. So on
a unit that can do 4000 SAs, you can now do only 3994 SAs.

Am I making a mistake here ?

Paul