Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.txt
Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net> Wed, 12 December 2001 19:10 UTC
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Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.txt
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 19 Nov 2001 08:29:07 -0500" <200111191329.IAA26802@ietf.org>
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Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2001 03:37:45 +0900
From: Shoichi Sakane <sakane@kame.net>
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> Title : The HMAC-SHA-256-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec > Author(s) : S. Frankel, S. Kelly > Filename : draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.txt > Pages : 8 > Date : 16-Nov-01 the section 5 in RFC2104 says, We recommend that the output length t be not less than half the length of the hash output (to match the birthday attack bound) and not less than 80 bits (a suitable lower bound on the number of bits that need to be predicted by an attacker). is that ok to truncate into 96bit ?
- I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.txt Internet-Drafts
- Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.t… Hugo Krawczyk
- Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.t… Shoichi Sakane
- Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.t… Paul Koning
- Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.t… Bart Preneel
- Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.t… Steven M. Bellovin
- Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00.t… Bart Preneel