[Ipsec] Last Call: 'The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)' to Proposed Standard

[The IESG <[e-mail]>]

The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider the
following document:

- 'The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)'
    <draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis-05.txt> as a Proposed Standard

On 1 July 2005 the IESG received a request to consider publication
of draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis-03 as a standards-track RFC. Updates
were made based on IETF Last Call comments, the -04 version of the
document was discussed during the telechat of 1 September 2005. The
document was approved, and placed in the the RFC Editor queue.  On
29 September 2005, Paul Hoffman asked the IESG to rescind approval
of the document due to an implementation issue that was discovered
at the IKEv2 bake-off. The attached note describes this situation
more completely.  Now, version -05 has addressed this concern, and
the IESG has been asked to consider publication of the updated
document as a standards-track RFC.

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
[e-mail] or [e-mail] mailing lists by 2005-11-23.

The file can be obtained via
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis-05.txt



--- Message Rescinding Approval of draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis-04 ---

To: IETF Announcement list <[e-mail]>
From: IESG <[e-mail]>
Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2005 11:22:01 -0400
Cc: [e-mail], [e-mail]
Subject: Rescinding Approval of draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis-04


On 1 July 2005 the IESG received a request from Paul Hoffman to
consider publication of draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis-03 as a
standards-track RFC. Updates were made based on IETF Last Call
comments, the -04 version of the document was discussed during
the telechat of 1 September 2005. The document was approved, and
it is now in the RFC Editor queue.

On 29 September 2005, Paul Hoffman asked the IESG to rescind
approval of the document due to an implementation issue that was
discovered at the IKEv2 bake-off. A summary of the problem is:

In IKEv2 section 2.14 on generating keying material, it says:

   "If the negotiated prf takes a fixed length key and the lengths
   of Ni and Nr do not add up to that length, half the bits must
   come from Ni and half from Nr, taking the first bits of each."

In section 2.15 on authentication, it says:

   "If the negotiated prf takes a fixed size key, the shared secret
   MUST be of that fixed size."

In draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis-04 section 1.1 says:

   "This document specifies the same algorithm as RFC 3664 except
   that the restriction on keys having to be exactly 128 bits from
   [AES-XCBC-MAC] is removed. Implementations of RFC 3664 will
   have the same bits-on-the-wire results as this algorithm; the
   only difference is that keys that were not equal in length to
   128 bits will no longer be rejected, but instead will be made
   128 bits.

The problem is that changing from fixed-key-size to variable-key-size
changes the bits output from generating keying material. Because the
nonces must each be at least 128 bits (from IKEv2 section 2.10), the
lengths will never add up to the key length unless the key is 256 or
longer.

A new version of draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis has been posted that attempts
to solve the problem. This new version will be the subject of a
separate IETF Last Call and IESG action. Accordingly, the IESG agreed
to rescind approval to publish draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis-04 as a
standards-track RFC. This decision requires that the following action
by the RFC Editor:

   Please remove draft-hoffman-rfc3664bis-04.txt from the RFC Editor
   queue and discontinue processing of the document.


_______________________________________________
IETF-Announce mailing list
[e-mail]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce

_______________________________________________
Ipsec mailing list
[e-mail]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec