[IPsec] Re: AD comments on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention

Songbo Bu <king347608@gmail.com> Tue, 26 May 2026 01:19 UTC

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From: Songbo Bu <king347608@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 09:19:37 +0800
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Subject: [IPsec] Re: AD comments on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention
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Hi Valery, Deb,

On the detection-mechanism point, I think Valery’s explanation is useful
and probably only needs a short paragraph to make the behavior explicit for
implementers.

One possible wording:

The mechanism defined in this document does not require a separate
downgrade-detection procedure. Instead, the additional initial-exchange
data is included in the input to the IKEv2 authentication calculation. When
a peer verifies the peer’s authentication data, a modification to the
protected initial messages is detected as an authentication failure. The
peer is not expected to distinguish this failure from other authentication
failures, such as use of an incorrect credential or a local configuration
mismatch.

The main thing I would want to preserve is that this is an
authentication-failure path, not a new diagnostic signal that
implementations have to expose differently.

Best,
Songbo Bu

On Mon, 25 May 2026 17:12:59 +0300, Valery Smyslov svan@elvis.ru wrote:

Hi Deb,

thank you for the review. Please see inline.

Thank you for your work on this draft. I found it to be well written and
easy to read (and super nice to be able to read a technical draft that I
understand!).

I have a few comments that I’d like you to address:

Section 1, para 2: Perhaps consider adding a phrase in the middle of this
sentence to say what the goal of this specification is: ‘…the data to be
authenticated in IKEv2 to prevent particular downgrade attacks, and
thus.....’ [nothing else in the intro gives even a hint of the plan]

Done.

Section 4: Consider making two subsections, one for each attack type, just
to add clarity.

I’m a bit unsure whether this would help. First, the attacks are almost
identical, with very minor difference.

The prerequisites and the impact are different, but the attack steps are
the same and for this reason

only KCI attack is described in full details. Then, frankly we are not sure
that this list of two attacks

is exhaustive (and thus use “at least two attacks” wordings). Putting them
into subsections

will implicitly indicate that no other attacks are known.

I’d rather hear from Chris and others whether this change is needed.

Section 4, first # list, 3: Will either (initiator or responder) work? Or
do we really need the attacker know/be able to break the initiator’s auth
key?

The attack is described for the case the initiator’s key is compromised,
since this is the most

straightforward downgrade attack. If the responder’s key is compromised (a
mirror situation), then the negotiated

algorithms cannot be downgraded. However, for some IKE extensions, when the
responder sends

its preferences first in IKE_SA_INIT response, not in a response to
initiator’s proposals (e.g., Certificate Request, Auth Announce),

the attacker can change them unnoticed. This seems not as severe, as the
downgrade attack, but still.

We have some text about this later.

Do you think a clarification is needed in the list item?

Section 4, second # list: Are there initiator proposed protocol extensions
that can be removed/added to help the attacker?

I don’t think so. The attack is applied to the core IKEv2, irrelevant to
the proposed extensions.

Section 4, third # list, step 6: The attacker either knows the initiator’s
long-term auth key, or must be able to break it in real time. At the
expense of brevity, I would add the additional phrase here. Perhaps ‘and
knows or can break the initiator’s long-term authentication key.’

How about:

The attacker is able to do this because it knows the

session keys and either knows the initiator’s long-term

authentication key or can break its authentication algorithm.

This is a bit more accurate, since if attacker could be able forge the
signature without breaking the key.

Section 4, para after third # list: Is this in addition to knowing/breaking
the initiator’s auth key? The attacker can still choose the weak key
exchange if they know/can break the responder’s auth key?

No, this is an alternative use case. The attacker knows only one long-term
key – either the initiator’s one or the responder’s one.

We described attack in detail for the first case, but mention here, that
for the second case, while less severe, some attacks are also plausible.

If the attacker knows both long-term keys and can break into session keys
too, we are helpless…

Section 4, second to last para: I’m assuming that the attacker is not
required to be on the path for the whole session. If I am correct, consider
a small addition ‘be able to passively read’. [if there is a more
appropriate word for ‘passively’, I’m fine with that, it is just the way I
think about it.]

Done.

Section 4, last para: Consider replacing ‘because peers would disable’ with
‘which encouraged peers to disable’, or something similar. I would remove
‘on the other hand’, as this is part of the discussion - uncertainty about
whether algorithms are secure or insecure. During a migration period, it is
harder to determine which algorithms are secure/insecure, which makes these
attacks more relevant.

Done.

Section 5, second to last para: Not all attacks are a result of
knowing/breaking the initiator auth key, there is at least one variant
where the responder’s auth key is know/breakable. Consider changing ‘In
particular, for the attacks’ to ‘For example, for the attacks…

Done.

Section 5 or 6: Spelling out the actual detection mechanism: Can we add
something that says how the impersonated entity can determine that they
have been attacked by determining that Message1 (or Message2) is different
than what was originally sent? Presumably they have to construct the hash
and then validate the signature.

Yes, but not as some separate check. With this extension the way
authentication data (e.g. signatures) is calculated in IKEv2

is modified, so that both initial messages are now included under
signature. Thus we make sure that their modification

will be detected at least by one peer when it verifies the IKEv2
authentication data sent by the peer . And if the verification fails,

the peer cannot tell that it is due to the attempted impersonation attack
or due to any other reason (e.g., misconfigured long-term keys).

Should we add any clarification, and if yes, can you propose some text,
please?

Section 8, Note between para 3 and 4: This doesn’t read properly, ‘one of
the long term authentication information’, but I can’t quite figure out how
to suggest it be corrected.

Perhaps “credentials”?

Section 8, para 4 and 5: I would flip these paragraphs, start with ‘avoid
using the same key for different purposes’, and then talk about what the
risk is.

OK.

Nits:
Section 4, before second numbered list: ‘In case the’/’In the case where
the’.

Fixed.

Thanks again for your review! I created a PR:

https://github.com/smyslov/ikev2-downgrade-prevention/pull/42

Regards,

Valery.

Deb Cooley

Sec AD