Re: [IPsec] Security consideration for DTLS: Adversarial packet loss/reordering
Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 11 February 2011 21:05 UTC
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Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2011 23:05:38 +0200
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: IPsecme WG <ipsec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Security consideration for DTLS: Adversarial packet loss/reordering
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Hi Steve, [Cross-posted to ipsecme] I have always wondered about these sequence numbers, and the concept of anti-replay in IPsec. - IPsec is architecturally a "plug-in replacement" for IP. And IP allows for arbitrary packet deletion, duplication and reordering. - Anti-replay counters are giving us no end of trouble in clustered environments (e.g. http://tools.ietf.org/wg/ipsecme/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ipsecha-protocol/). - IPsec (unfortunately) does not have an application API, at least in most implementations. Such an API might indeed have put this feature to good use. - And lastly, IPsec anti-replay is optional, which signifies to me that it's always been an iffy feature. I have looked at RFC 4301 again (the IPsec architecture), and it provides only weak justification for this feature. Can you please point me to a more convincing reasoning? Thanks, Yaron > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2011 19:51:08 -0500 > From: Steven Bellovin<smb@cs.columbia.edu> > Subject: Re: [TLS] Security consideration for DTLS: Adversarial packet > loss/reordering > To: Eric Rescorla<ekr@rtfm.com> > Cc: Paul Hoffman<paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, tls@ietf.org > Message-ID:<DE870EA2-AB00-48E8-B9D6-D711569F7C1C@cs.columbia.edu> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > On Feb 10, 2011, at 3:03 21PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > >> On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 12:03 PM, Eric Rescorla<ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: >>> On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 11:31 AM, Paul Hoffman<paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote: >>>> On 2/10/11 9:49 AM, Matt McCutchen wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Here's an issue that might be worth adding as a security consideration >>>>> in the next version of the DTLS specification. It may affect IPsec too; >>>>> I haven't looked into that. Thoughts? >>>> >>>> I disagree with this suggestion, at least as it is proposed. >>>> >>>>> DTLS does not prevent an attacker from dropping or reordering records. >>>>> Datagram applications are generally designed to tolerate random packet >>>>> loss and reordering, but care must be taken to ensure that adversarial >>>>> loss and reordering cannot break the desired higher-level security >>>>> properties. >>>> >>>> That "care" sounds like it is care in the DTLS-using protocol, but no >>>> suggestion is given how such a protocol can show care. This makes the >>>> suggestion little more than "be careful", which is not useful. >>> >>> DTLS does deliver order information, of course. It just doesn't impose >>> reordering. >>> >>> Perhaps the take-home for DTLS itself is that it would be nice if >>> packets came with >>> their sequence numbers attached. >>> >> >> In the API, I mean. >> > Given the importance of sequence numbers for IPsec, I very much agree. > > > --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb >
- Re: [IPsec] Security consideration for DTLS: Adve… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [IPsec] Security consideration for DTLS: Adve… Stephen Kent