[IPsec] Re: Call for adoption: draft-wang-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-03 (Ends 2026-02-09)

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Thu, 22 January 2026 21:04 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: [IPsec] Re: Call for adoption: draft-wang-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-03 (Ends 2026-02-09)
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I have read draft-wang-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo-03.

I support adoption.  I am not sure the WG has a clear overall strategy.

I haven't done a detailed comparison to the ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem document.

If we are going to have a document-per-major algorithm, then I would like to
suggest that they have very similiar table of contents.
I also don't think we need so much motherhood text in the introduction of
either document.  (Surely CFRG or PQUIP documents that say it all)

From what I understand, both mlkem and frodo-kem will first do a
quantum-vulnerable (I like to call them "DISCO era" rather than "legacy")
exchange.  {I think the use of the term "regular key exchange" is wrong}
Then they use IKE_INTERMEDIATE in order to be able to transport the bigger
keys/key agreements.

Neither document has any test vectors that I could see.
I guess they will be big :-(


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide