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Re: [IPsec] TCP and MOBIKE

David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 08 November 2018 05:16 UTC

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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2018 12:16:28 +0700
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To: smyslov.ietf@gmail.com
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] TCP and MOBIKE
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I'm having a hard time imagining why anyone would want to use
NO_NATS_ALLOWED with TCP encapsulation. If you're encapsulating in TCP it
means that there is something on path even worse than a NAT, right?

Perhaps we could simply say you MUST NOT use NO_NATS_ALLOWED with TCP
encaps?

David

On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 12:07 PM Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> coming back to the yesterday discussion. There seems to be another issue
> if implementation first sends request to update address over UDP and
> then switches to TCP. The problem arises if NO_NATS_ALLOWED is included -
> it contains IP addresses and ports for initiator and responder. If you
> leave it intact while switching to TCP, then it won't match real addresses
> and the responder will treat it as NAT presence. In this case RFC 4555
> suggests to retry sending request several times with a new INFORMATIONAL
> request. Probably we could clarify in TCP guidelines draft that the content
> of NO_NATS_ALLOWED MUST be recalculated in this case? Or is it obvious?
>
> Regards,
> Valery.
>
>
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