[IPsec] Re: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention-05 ietf last call Genart review

[Valery Smyslov <[e-mail]>]

Hi Linda,

thank you for your review. Please, see inline.

> Document: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention
> Title: Downgrade Prevention for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
> (IKEv2) Reviewer: Linda Dunbar Review result: Ready with Nits
> 
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
> by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
> 
> For more information, please see the FAQ at
> 
> <https://wiki.ietf.org/en/group/gen/GenArtFAQ>.
> 
> Document: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention-??
> Reviewer: Linda Dunbar
> Review Date: 2026-06-12
> IETF LC End Date: 2026-06-12
> IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
> 
> Summary: This draft updates IKEv2 by adding a negotiation signal and modified
> AUTH transcript so both peers authenticate the same full IKE_SA_INIT
> conversation, preventing attackers from silently downgrading the connection to
> weaker key exchange methods or stripped extensions
> 
> Major issues: None
> 
> Minor issues: None
> 
> Nits/editorial comments:
> 
> - Section 6 says the responder includes the notification “regardless of whether
> it was received in the request or not,” and later says the modified
> authentication calculation is used only if a peer both sent and received the
> notification. Just wondering what to do when only one direction contains the
> notification.

Then the old logic (defined in Section 2.15 of RFC 7296) is used.

> - Section 4: s/Having these preconditions the goal of the attacker is to
> eavesdrop/Given these preconditions, the goal of the attacker is to eavesdrop/
> 
> - should expand PQ/T on the first use.

Thanks, a PR is created:
https://github.com/smyslov/ikev2-downgrade-prevention/pull/46

Regards,
Valery.

> 
> Best regards,
> Linda Dunbar