Re: [IPsec] [Last-Call] [I2nsf] [yang-doctors] Yangdoctors last call review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08

[Christian Hopps <[e-mail]>]

> On Sep 23, 2020, at 6:58 AM, Martin Björklund <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Christian Hopps <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>> On Sep 23, 2020, at 5:29 AM, Rafa Marin-Lopez <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> But I would like to check: My understanding is that the changes that
>>>> Chris is proposing are pretty small.  I.e. move the SA structure under
>>>> ipsec-common, and put it under a YANG feature.  Are you sure that it
>>>> is impractical to accommodate this change which would allow a single
>>>> ipsec module to be shared and extended via YANG augmentations?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> In the context of our I-D, if we move SAD structure to ipsec-common,
>>> what we are meaning is that IPsec SA configuration data (setting
>>> values to the SAD structure) are common to the IKE case and the
>>> IKE-less cases, which are not. It is confusing.
>> 
>> Something defined in a common module but marked as a feature does not
>> imply that that feature has to be implemented by an importing
>> module. This is not confusing to YANG implementers or users I
>> think. If we are just talking about document flow here, then a
>> sentence saying "the SAD feature is not required to implement IKE
>> functionality" is quite enough to clear that up I think.
> 
> Another alternative could be to move these containers to another
> (new) module.

It may also be enough to mark the notifications in the ikeless module as a feature I suppose. That is the actual thing I think non-SDN implementations would want to omit. The module name "ikeless" is not great in this case, but perhaps workable.

This is a sub-optimal compromise b/c all IPsec have SA databases even ones running IKE -- i.e., SA databases are common whether exposed in YANG or not -- but if it can move it forward perhaps good enough.

I'm definitely concerned about IETF process and real world usability here. These modules are basically workable for ipsec I think, they could be used by operators today. If we restart the entire process to redo this work for the more generic IPsec case it will probably be years before they are finished and in the field. This new work can be started, but why not have something usable in the meantime?

Thanks,
Chris.

> 
> 
> /martin
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> Chris.
>> 
>>> Moreover, the usage of feature means that, after all, this “common” is
>>> not “common” to both cases IKE case and IKE-less. Again, it seems
>>> confusing. In the IKE case, the SDN/I2NSF controller does not
>>> configure the SAD at all but the IKE implementation in the NSF. In our
>>> opinion, in order to properly add this IPsec SA operational state to
>>> the IKE case we should include operational data about the IPsec SAs
>>> (config false) to the ietf-ipsec-ike. Alternatively, we have certain
>>> operational data (ro) in the SAD structure in the IKE-less case. If
>>> only those are moved to the common part should be ok but we think it
>>> does not solve the problem.
>>> 
>> 
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