[IPsec] Proposed minutes of the virtual meeting

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Thu, 01 October 2009 18:18 UTC

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Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2009 11:19:47 -0700
To: IPsecme WG <ipsec@ietf.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: [IPsec] Proposed minutes of the virtual meeting
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Sorry about the delay in getting these out. Please send any changes to the list. If you want to talk about a particular item that we discussed, **change the subject line to be something appropriate to the topic**.

--Paul Hoffman

IPsecME WG
Interim Meeting
2009-09-22, across many different timezones
Using TeamSpeak for voice
Co-chaired by Yaron Sheffer and Paul Hoffman
Minutes by Paul Hoffman

Slides and agenda are at http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/ipsecme/trac/wiki/Interim20090922
These minutes only cover things not in those slides
Recording is at http://www.vpnc.org/IPsecMEinterim-2009-09.mp3

Attendees (virtual bluesheet):
	Dave Wierbowski
	Dragan Grebovich
	Gabriel Montenegro
	Guy Snyder
	Hannes Tschofenig
	Jean-Michel Combes
	Jouni Korhonen
	Julien Laganier
	Kalyani Garigipati
	Ken Grewal
	Michael Richardson
	Paul Hoffman
	Peny Yang
	Raj
	Richard Graveman
	Scott Moonen
	Sheila Frankel
	Tero Kivinen
	Yaron Sheffer
	Yoav Nir

Agenda bash, document status
	Yaron and Paul
	This is an official interim, we follow the same rules as a regular f2f meeting
	Start with short reports on current documents, minus AES-CTR
	No changes or additions from the room
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-redirect has been approved for RFC production
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-ipv6-config is in AD review

AES-CTR
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2
	Discussion by Yaron
	Is in WG Last Call
	Need more comments

ESP-null heuristics
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics
	Discussion by Tero
	There are a few more comments, there will be a revision

Roadmap
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-roadmap
	Discussion by Sheila
	Combined algorithms  for IKEv1 and IPsec-v2
		Scott: thinks it's fine to do in IKEv1
		Sheila: We can assume that we are using IKEv1 with the new IPsec
		Tero: Should be able to used.
		Sheila will add wording to make using IKEv1 less murky
	Does IKEv2 truncate its ICV?
		Scott: Some IKEv2 transforms are defined for both truncated and non-truncated forms
		Sheila: Can you negotiate either form?
		Scott: Yes
		Tero: Non-truncated version is mostly used only for FibreChannel
			Do whatever the negotiated algorith says
		Sheila: Should we put something in the doc about the two forms?
		Paul: Yes, add a clarification, and we should add that clarification in IKEv2bis
		Paul: Keep moving, don't wait for IKEv2bis
	Use of AES-XCBC in IKE
		Paul: It sounds like RFC 4109 needs to be revised
		Yaron: Roadmap should say that it is currently undefined
			Say that it is a bug in the spec
	Internet Drafts included in roadmap
		BEET has encountered resistance in the IETF, and it might be abandoned
		What about expired drafts that will never become RFCs
			Some were not progressed because of security concerns
		Tero: If you implement road warrior with IKEv1, you have to support both drafts
			Most support some version of the drafts
		Hannes: Maybe this means this should be an Informational RFC
		Tero: But there are serious security problems
			If people move to IKEv2 we don't need these
			Adding some pointer to the drafts, but think hard before implementing them
			Say "there is a good reason why they are expired"
		Paul: Not true that everyone needs to implement them.
			VPNC sees only about half the vendors have implemented them.
			Worse, people have implemented them incorrectly for what they indicate they are doing
			There were other ways of doing XAUTH that did get into implementations
			Say "There have been various ways of doing configuration and extended auth"
				But don't list any drafts
		Michael: We have to mention them and say that they were bad, the ideas are in IKEv2
			Would like th see the two drafts put somewhere and listed as "do not implmement"
		Yaron: Supports Tero's position, do need to metion them by name
		Tero: Wants a big warning that they are not safe to implement
		Sheila: Will add text to mention the problems in the IKEv1 description
		Paul: We will need a second WGLC on these issues anyway
	Camellia for IKEv2 :undefined (no RFC)
		Tero: We use the same IANA numbers for IPsec and IKEv2
			You get the IKEv2 number automatically
			Hopes that the combined mode doc for ESP can be used in IKEv2
			IKEv2 tells how to use CBC, and the same for combined mode
			Wanted this for the AES-CTR
		Paul: Concern for making CTR generic is that we can only do it for what we know today
			People can write short documents if they want a CTR mode for a function
		Tero: The Camellia people failed to make their document specific enough for IKEv2
			Wants to limit the number of RFCs for cipher
		Paul: Agree that we don't want separate drafts for ESP and IKEv2
			Disagree about wanting to limit the number of RFCs
		Yaron: Are there others?
		Tero: No
		Yaron: Then let's leave the AES-CTR alone and let the Camellia people do their own thing
	We need to open each of these issues in the issue tracker
		No formal WGLC again, but need to close out the new issues
		Then have a new document and go to AD
	Will reformat the document to help make following specific documents easier

Session resumption
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption
	Discussion by Yaron
	Peny: Understands that resumption detection is out of scope
		Maybe we can have more text to discuss the risks of not detecting resumption
	Paul: Wants specific wording sent to the list so we can decide if it should remain out of scope
	Yaron: It needs to remain out of scope
		There are already two drafts on how to do quick, secure detection
		Doesn't want the proposed new text to be so specific that it would show preference towards one over the other
	Paul: Maybe have the issue brought up in the Security Considerations
	Yaron: There is a new section in -08 that may already cover this sufficiently
	Paul: If Peny has specific issues with that new text, please bring it to the list.
	Peny: Wants to know the rationale for 4.3.4 for silently deleting old SA
		Maybe the gateway can just reject the resumptions request
	Yaron: This is an anomalous case where the client detects a failure but the gateway is not sync'd
		It does not mean that the client is mailicious
		There is nothing you can do with the old stuff, so you just delete it
	Peny: The client might have been deceived
		The gateway should not have to delete it because there is more work for the gateway
	Paul: Disagrees that we need to worry about how much work the gateway has to do
	Tero: From the client's point of view, it has lost its SA, and that's why it is resuming
		The gateway should assume the same thing, namely that the client has lost its SA
		There is no reason to send a delete on the old SA because it is dead
		Also: the client is asking for conflicting traffic selectors, so get rid of the old ones first
	Peny: Disagrees that the client would only do resumption when it has lost the SA
		Might do it when it detects the failure of the gateway
	Tero: If the gateway has failed, it has no SAs up
	Paul: Please take this to the list
	Peny: Brings up old topic
	Paul: This is not a good place to be discussing this
		WG chairs are tasked with deciding consensus
		If you disagree with a consensus call, take it to the AD

WESP
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility
	Discussion by Ken and Gabriel
	One proposal is to have flexible padding length
		Pad lengths can be extended in the future
		We know we need pad of four bytes for IPv6
	Tero: How are you planning to handle for the IANA registry?
		IANA registry will have bit numbers, but not the pictures
	Gabriel: The whole field is called the Flags field
	Lots to discuss on the list
	Yaron: Padding options looks too complex, would prefer one bit that means "extra four bytes"
	Tero: Agree
	
Possible recharter items
	IPsec/IKE High Availability (draft-nir-ipsecme-ipsecha)
		Discussion by Yoav
		Tero: Doesn't think that the IKEv2 state needs any help from the other end
			Sync channel will not be problem for IKEv2 messages, but will be for ESP
		Yaron: The proposal is not to have just a problem statement like this document
			We want to have a solution as a WG item
		Tero: Doesn't think this a problem big enough for a WG item
		Kalyani: Thinks that this is a big enough problem in many scenarios
		Tero: The sync channel has not been a big issues for my customers
			Doesn't need protocol help
		Raj: May need protocol help
		Yoav: If there is a failure, it is much harder to sync the HA
			Need some help here		
	IKEv2 message ID and HA
		Discussion by Kalyani
		Yaron: Please use the standard Internet Draft format in the next draft
		Raj: If we implement this solution but not in a cluster, it looks like session resumption
		Kalyani: This could also be used for resyncing peers (gives scenarios)
		Paul: We need a draft in front of us in order to continue the discussion
		
IKEv2bis open issues
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis
	Skipped the presentation because we only have ten minutes left
	Certificate issues came up in issue #107
	Presentation by Yaron
		Yoav and Yaron came up with a list of possible issues
		Tero: Maybe allow hash-and-URL along with bundles
		Need to consider what will make things simpler
		We will have a bunch of new certificate issues on the list
	A new draft of IKEv2bis will be out early the week of 2009-10-05
	We know that some issues will be re-opened
	We are slipping from when we wanted WG LC, but the reasons are good, namely that we are hearing good implementer comments

Finished in two hours