[IPsec] Proposed minutes of the virtual meeting
Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Thu, 01 October 2009 18:18 UTC
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Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2009 11:19:47 -0700
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Subject: [IPsec] Proposed minutes of the virtual meeting
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Sorry about the delay in getting these out. Please send any changes to the list. If you want to talk about a particular item that we discussed, **change the subject line to be something appropriate to the topic**. --Paul Hoffman IPsecME WG Interim Meeting 2009-09-22, across many different timezones Using TeamSpeak for voice Co-chaired by Yaron Sheffer and Paul Hoffman Minutes by Paul Hoffman Slides and agenda are at http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/ipsecme/trac/wiki/Interim20090922 These minutes only cover things not in those slides Recording is at http://www.vpnc.org/IPsecMEinterim-2009-09.mp3 Attendees (virtual bluesheet): Dave Wierbowski Dragan Grebovich Gabriel Montenegro Guy Snyder Hannes Tschofenig Jean-Michel Combes Jouni Korhonen Julien Laganier Kalyani Garigipati Ken Grewal Michael Richardson Paul Hoffman Peny Yang Raj Richard Graveman Scott Moonen Sheila Frankel Tero Kivinen Yaron Sheffer Yoav Nir Agenda bash, document status Yaron and Paul This is an official interim, we follow the same rules as a regular f2f meeting Start with short reports on current documents, minus AES-CTR No changes or additions from the room draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-redirect has been approved for RFC production draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-ipv6-config is in AD review AES-CTR draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2 Discussion by Yaron Is in WG Last Call Need more comments ESP-null heuristics draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics Discussion by Tero There are a few more comments, there will be a revision Roadmap draft-ietf-ipsecme-roadmap Discussion by Sheila Combined algorithms for IKEv1 and IPsec-v2 Scott: thinks it's fine to do in IKEv1 Sheila: We can assume that we are using IKEv1 with the new IPsec Tero: Should be able to used. Sheila will add wording to make using IKEv1 less murky Does IKEv2 truncate its ICV? Scott: Some IKEv2 transforms are defined for both truncated and non-truncated forms Sheila: Can you negotiate either form? Scott: Yes Tero: Non-truncated version is mostly used only for FibreChannel Do whatever the negotiated algorith says Sheila: Should we put something in the doc about the two forms? Paul: Yes, add a clarification, and we should add that clarification in IKEv2bis Paul: Keep moving, don't wait for IKEv2bis Use of AES-XCBC in IKE Paul: It sounds like RFC 4109 needs to be revised Yaron: Roadmap should say that it is currently undefined Say that it is a bug in the spec Internet Drafts included in roadmap BEET has encountered resistance in the IETF, and it might be abandoned What about expired drafts that will never become RFCs Some were not progressed because of security concerns Tero: If you implement road warrior with IKEv1, you have to support both drafts Most support some version of the drafts Hannes: Maybe this means this should be an Informational RFC Tero: But there are serious security problems If people move to IKEv2 we don't need these Adding some pointer to the drafts, but think hard before implementing them Say "there is a good reason why they are expired" Paul: Not true that everyone needs to implement them. VPNC sees only about half the vendors have implemented them. Worse, people have implemented them incorrectly for what they indicate they are doing There were other ways of doing XAUTH that did get into implementations Say "There have been various ways of doing configuration and extended auth" But don't list any drafts Michael: We have to mention them and say that they were bad, the ideas are in IKEv2 Would like th see the two drafts put somewhere and listed as "do not implmement" Yaron: Supports Tero's position, do need to metion them by name Tero: Wants a big warning that they are not safe to implement Sheila: Will add text to mention the problems in the IKEv1 description Paul: We will need a second WGLC on these issues anyway Camellia for IKEv2 :undefined (no RFC) Tero: We use the same IANA numbers for IPsec and IKEv2 You get the IKEv2 number automatically Hopes that the combined mode doc for ESP can be used in IKEv2 IKEv2 tells how to use CBC, and the same for combined mode Wanted this for the AES-CTR Paul: Concern for making CTR generic is that we can only do it for what we know today People can write short documents if they want a CTR mode for a function Tero: The Camellia people failed to make their document specific enough for IKEv2 Wants to limit the number of RFCs for cipher Paul: Agree that we don't want separate drafts for ESP and IKEv2 Disagree about wanting to limit the number of RFCs Yaron: Are there others? Tero: No Yaron: Then let's leave the AES-CTR alone and let the Camellia people do their own thing We need to open each of these issues in the issue tracker No formal WGLC again, but need to close out the new issues Then have a new document and go to AD Will reformat the document to help make following specific documents easier Session resumption draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption Discussion by Yaron Peny: Understands that resumption detection is out of scope Maybe we can have more text to discuss the risks of not detecting resumption Paul: Wants specific wording sent to the list so we can decide if it should remain out of scope Yaron: It needs to remain out of scope There are already two drafts on how to do quick, secure detection Doesn't want the proposed new text to be so specific that it would show preference towards one over the other Paul: Maybe have the issue brought up in the Security Considerations Yaron: There is a new section in -08 that may already cover this sufficiently Paul: If Peny has specific issues with that new text, please bring it to the list. Peny: Wants to know the rationale for 4.3.4 for silently deleting old SA Maybe the gateway can just reject the resumptions request Yaron: This is an anomalous case where the client detects a failure but the gateway is not sync'd It does not mean that the client is mailicious There is nothing you can do with the old stuff, so you just delete it Peny: The client might have been deceived The gateway should not have to delete it because there is more work for the gateway Paul: Disagrees that we need to worry about how much work the gateway has to do Tero: From the client's point of view, it has lost its SA, and that's why it is resuming The gateway should assume the same thing, namely that the client has lost its SA There is no reason to send a delete on the old SA because it is dead Also: the client is asking for conflicting traffic selectors, so get rid of the old ones first Peny: Disagrees that the client would only do resumption when it has lost the SA Might do it when it detects the failure of the gateway Tero: If the gateway has failed, it has no SAs up Paul: Please take this to the list Peny: Brings up old topic Paul: This is not a good place to be discussing this WG chairs are tasked with deciding consensus If you disagree with a consensus call, take it to the AD WESP draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility Discussion by Ken and Gabriel One proposal is to have flexible padding length Pad lengths can be extended in the future We know we need pad of four bytes for IPv6 Tero: How are you planning to handle for the IANA registry? IANA registry will have bit numbers, but not the pictures Gabriel: The whole field is called the Flags field Lots to discuss on the list Yaron: Padding options looks too complex, would prefer one bit that means "extra four bytes" Tero: Agree Possible recharter items IPsec/IKE High Availability (draft-nir-ipsecme-ipsecha) Discussion by Yoav Tero: Doesn't think that the IKEv2 state needs any help from the other end Sync channel will not be problem for IKEv2 messages, but will be for ESP Yaron: The proposal is not to have just a problem statement like this document We want to have a solution as a WG item Tero: Doesn't think this a problem big enough for a WG item Kalyani: Thinks that this is a big enough problem in many scenarios Tero: The sync channel has not been a big issues for my customers Doesn't need protocol help Raj: May need protocol help Yoav: If there is a failure, it is much harder to sync the HA Need some help here IKEv2 message ID and HA Discussion by Kalyani Yaron: Please use the standard Internet Draft format in the next draft Raj: If we implement this solution but not in a cluster, it looks like session resumption Kalyani: This could also be used for resyncing peers (gives scenarios) Paul: We need a draft in front of us in order to continue the discussion IKEv2bis open issues draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis Skipped the presentation because we only have ten minutes left Certificate issues came up in issue #107 Presentation by Yaron Yoav and Yaron came up with a list of possible issues Tero: Maybe allow hash-and-URL along with bundles Need to consider what will make things simpler We will have a bunch of new certificate issues on the list A new draft of IKEv2bis will be out early the week of 2009-10-05 We know that some issues will be re-opened We are slipping from when we wanted WG LC, but the reasons are good, namely that we are hearing good implementer comments Finished in two hours
- [IPsec] Proposed minutes of the virtual meeting Paul Hoffman