Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike

mohamed.boucadair@orange.com Thu, 10 February 2022 06:50 UTC

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From: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
To: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
CC: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 06:50:33 +0000
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
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Hi Paul,

As a follow-up to:

> Ah, I see. I would probably use some different terminology then, and
> extend the text talking aboyt "as per Section 8 of [RFC8310]" to clarify
> that. I'll see about producing some text for you.
> 
> Paul

I wonder whether you had time to check the version we published back in December (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike/) and identify candidate changes. 

Thank you. 

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
> Envoyé : lundi 8 novembre 2021 19:06
> À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
> Cc : Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>; ipsec@ietf.org
> Objet : Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption call for draft-btw-add-ipsecme-ike
> 
...
> 
> >> I am also not clear on the real use of negotiating hash algorithms
> >> for the digest receiving of the ADD server "identity?", as the
> >> document states the authentication happens as per Section 8 of
> >> [RFC8310] which lists WebPKI or DANE authentication against the name
> >> and these methods do not use this digest. I also do not understand
> >> the use of the digest. For authentication, is it not needed as the
> >> entire IKEv2 exchange is authenticated.
> >
> > [Med] We added the digest to address one of the comments raised in a
> previous ipsecme meetings: allow to not rely on PKI for validating the
> encrypted DNS server certificate but convey the end-entity certificate
> in IKEv2 itself.
> 
> Ah, I see. I would probably use some different terminology then, and
> extend the text talking aboyt "as per Section 8 of [RFC8310]" to clarify
> that. I'll see about producing some text for you.
> 
> Paul

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