Re: Remove SHOULD for elliptic curve groups in IKEv2

"The Purple Streak (Hilarie Orman)" <ho@alum.mit.edu> Wed, 13 March 2002 00:16 UTC

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Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2002 16:40:29 -0700
From: "The Purple Streak (Hilarie Orman)" <ho@alum.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: Remove SHOULD for elliptic curve groups in IKEv2
References: <Pine.BSI.3.91.1020312131533.25973E-100000@spsystems.net> <3C8E5E1F.4030000@alum.mit.edu> <kjr8mpsaqg.fsf@romeo.rtfm.com>
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Oakley and IKE and draft-orman-public-key-lengths-05 name the
algorithms, the strengths, computational scaling,  etc. of
ECC for Diffie-Hellman key agreement.  Mathematically,
the algorithm is DH using point addition in elliptic curve groups over 
GF[2^n].

Specific implementation techniques may be covered by patents, but
see, for example, Fast Key Exchange with Elliptic Curve Systems,
in Crypto '95, for details and pseudocode of a non-encumbered method.

Hilarie


----

Eric Rescorla wrote:


> What I think would be very helpful here would be if someone
> (you?) wrote a draft describing a single algorithm with:
> 
> (1) A description of its patent status (hopefully, with
>     some reference to the techniques having been published
>     prior to patents being filed).
> (2) Some estimate of its security properties (e.g. an estimate
>     of strength.)
> (3) Some description of (unencumbered) implementation techniques
>     along with performance numbers for those techniques,
>     perhaps with comparisons to RSA.
> 
> -Ekr
> 
>