Re: [IPsec] Potential issue with draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate
Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 11 November 2021 18:03 UTC
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Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 13:03:18 -0500
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
cc: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>, 'Tobias Brunner' <tobias@strongswan.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/vYazGl31jf08pDf39zi0LtEFn3I>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Potential issue with draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate
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On Thu, 11 Nov 2021, Tero Kivinen wrote: > My suggestion (as an individual not as a chair) is to add text to > security considerations section where we point out that > implementations should limit the number of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges > they allow to something sensible, like 10 or so. > > These are exchanges we are doing before authentication so limiting the > number of them is something we want to do anyways. I agree. Note, currently our implementation supports a maximum of 1 :) Paul
- [IPsec] Potential issue with draft-ietf-ipsecme-i… Valery Smyslov
- [IPsec] Potential issue with draft-ietf-ipsecme-i… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] Potential issue with draft-ietf-ipsec… Paul Wouters