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Re: [IPsec] FW: Quantum Resistance Requirements

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Fri, 28 October 2016 16:15 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluhrer@cisco.com>
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Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2016 12:15:49 -0400
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Cc: "IPsecme WG (ipsec@ietf.org)" <ipsec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] FW: Quantum Resistance Requirements
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Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer@cisco.com> wrote:
    > - What level of identity protection do we need to provide?  If two
    > different IKE negotiations use the same shared secret, do we mind if
    > someone can deduce that?

I think that this depends greatly upon the deployment scenario.

    > - Authentication; if someone with a Quantum Computer can break the DH
    > in real time, do we care if he can act as a man-in-the-middle?  Scott
    > Fluhrer: not important Michael Richardson: important, provided that we
    > don't run into the same issues that IKEv1 PSKs ran into Tommy Pauly:
    > not important Valery Smylsov: this would be nice to have Oscar
    > Garcia-Morchon: this would be nice to have

I'm very concerned that we don't wind up with insecure Group PSKs as we had
with IKEv1.

-- 
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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