Re: Updating to RFC6434 to deal with 8200-style header insertion by IPIP

Mikael Abrahamsson <swmike@swm.pp.se> Thu, 02 November 2017 13:04 UTC

Return-Path: <swmike@swm.pp.se>
X-Original-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4084813F613 for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 06:04:02 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.301
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.301 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=swm.pp.se
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1dhU36ZJr7nN for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 06:04:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from uplift.swm.pp.se (ipv6.swm.pp.se [IPv6:2a00:801::f]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 17701138103 for <ipv6@ietf.org>; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 06:03:53 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by uplift.swm.pp.se (Postfix, from userid 501) id 7F439B6; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 14:03:50 +0100 (CET)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=swm.pp.se; s=mail; t=1509627830; bh=3Bbiq8CLrgrVYihGjF07LrH05mM5v+9FjyGs1DcLlHU=; h=Date:From:To:cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=tIZnIf9ipWHNndQCl3913ji7PL2Tk/omvQHz1p7wERJShuvwQxIle6va6/JUC4PJD XL18bplXW55v0SXCEDYNMQ9UYPcudqqgDpWc2lIIW5i7eV3Ju6sSdu5S/IaSWhfypD EfPzjsWvsGax+1N1Wd0tW42Yo+HeAMiZmjuL4SRA=
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by uplift.swm.pp.se (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C3A2B5; Thu, 2 Nov 2017 14:03:50 +0100 (CET)
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2017 14:03:50 +0100
From: Mikael Abrahamsson <swmike@swm.pp.se>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
cc: 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Updating to RFC6434 to deal with 8200-style header insertion by IPIP
In-Reply-To: <19087.1509567897@obiwan.sandelman.ca>
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1711021402180.16389@uplift.swm.pp.se>
References: <CAOSSMjUVCSBjbYu3bc7DU+edz2+0+RvU_AMi4FNn2n2075kk9g@mail.gmail.com> <6286.1509408085@obiwan.sandelman.ca> <alpine.DEB.2.20.1711011139390.16389@uplift.swm.pp.se> <19087.1509567897@obiwan.sandelman.ca>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (DEB 67 2015-01-07)
Organization: People's Front Against WWW
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"; format="flowed"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipv6/-StUbnztjBkjgU5XawdLuFTsp18>
X-BeenThere: ipv6@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: "IPv6 Maintenance Working Group \(6man\)" <ipv6.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ipv6/>
List-Post: <mailto:ipv6@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2017 13:04:02 -0000

On Wed, 1 Nov 2017, Michael Richardson wrote:

> Removing redundant IPIP headers at the end-host provides no benefit to the
> end-host.  The end-host does this in order to facilitate some unknown service
> in the middle that did something.  If we want to enable such things to work
> without prior permission (cf: "permissionless innovation") then we need to
> fix hosts to do this.

I don't think we should. Whatever is done in the middle that does encap, 
should also make sure it's decap:ed before it reaches the end host.

>    > If the device isn't configured to do IPsec (even by default), then I don't
>    > think it should do what you describe.
>
> Yet we skip other extension headers in order to find the ULP.
> In fact, a host that has *NO* IPsec code *at all* will skip it as an unknown
> header....  Because we got this wrong, we couldn't use AH to secure ND or any
> other multicast (like OSPF) without causing of a flag day.  AH became totally
> USELESS.  It was sad.

Right. I forgot that IPSEC is an extension header in IPv6, I tought of it 
as something that was encapsulated. So I take back what I said.

-- 
Mikael Abrahamsson    email: swmike@swm.pp.se