Re: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Adoption call on draft-hinden-6man-rfc1981bis-01)
Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> Fri, 05 February 2016 18:30 UTC
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Subject: Re: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Adoption call on draft-hinden-6man-rfc1981bis-01)
To: "Templin, Fred L" <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>, "Fred Baker (fred)" <fred@cisco.com>
References: <2134F8430051B64F815C691A62D983183395EF42@XCH-BLV-105.nw.nos.boeing.com> <56B4E39A.5040608@si6networks.com> <2134F8430051B64F815C691A62D983183395F017@XCH-BLV-105.nw.nos.boeing.com>
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
Message-ID: <56B4EA46.3080102@si6networks.com>
Date: Fri, 05 Feb 2016 15:30:30 -0300
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Cc: 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>, Bob Hinden <bob.hinden@gmail.com>
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On 02/05/2016 03:25 PM, Templin, Fred L wrote: > Hi Fernando, > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Fernando Gont [mailto:fgont@si6networks.com] >> Sent: Friday, February 05, 2016 10:02 AM >> To: Templin, Fred L; Fred Baker (fred) >> Cc: 6man WG; Bob Hinden >> Subject: Re: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Adoption call on draft-hinden-6man-rfc1981bis-01) >> >> On 02/05/2016 02:46 PM, Templin, Fred L wrote: >>> Hi Fred, >>> >>>> As soon as I say "there is no such attack", one will materialize, so I won't assert that. However, I am not aware of attacks in which >>>> someone creates ICMP PTBs and sends them to someone else in order to reduce their windows unnecessarily. >>> >>> RFC4821 Section 11 (Security Considerations) recognizes the potential for spoofed >>> (i.e., inaccurate) ICMP PTB messages and suggests a mitigation (ignore all ICMP PTBs). >>> For paths over which any node in the network can inject an inaccurate ICMP PTB >>> message, an attack vector exists. >> >> In theory, you can do some basic validation for ICMP messages. However, >> in v6, as a result of possible EHs, you may not find any meaningful data >> in the ICMP payload to apply validity checks on. >> >> Anyway, you can implement the countermeasure we implemented in >> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5927#section-7.2> -- I implemented it >> for OpenBSD, and it still runs it... and IIRC it was ported to at least >> NetBSD later. > > Thanks for the reference. It seems to account for the case of paths that may > deliver inaccurate ICMP PTBs, but does not account for the case of paths that > fail to deliver accurate ICMP PTBs. Do we know of paths always deliver > accurate ICMP PTBs but can also deliver inaccurate ICMP PTBs? What do you mean by "accurate"? -- Fernando Gont SI6 Networks e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492
- Re: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Ado… Fernando Gont
- Re: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks Mark Andrews
- Re: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks Fernando Gont
- RE: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Ado… Templin, Fred L
- ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Adoptio… Templin, Fred L
- Re: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Ado… Fernando Gont
- RE: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Ado… Templin, Fred L
- Re: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Ado… Fernando Gont
- RE: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Ado… Templin, Fred L
- Re: ICMP PTB spoofing attacks (was: RE: 6MAN: Ado… Fernando Gont