Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-01.txt

Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> Sat, 15 February 2014 00:45 UTC

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Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 21:42:02 -0300
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com>, Alissa Cooper <alissa@cooperw.in>, "ipv6@ietf.org" <ipv6@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-01.txt
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Hi, Christian,

On 02/14/2014 09:23 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
>> 
>> I personally have no issues. My only "concern" is that if we start
>> discussing IDs other than the IPv6 addresses, we might later
>> discuss e.g. layer-7 stuff. Not that layer-2 and layer-7 privacy
>> issues are uninteresting.. but rather than the more focused we
>> stay, the more tractable the problem is.
> 
> I would not want to discuss in an IPv6 draft the precise mechanics of
> changing MAC addresses, or the policy controls to make avoid nasty
> side effects. I would like to see a simple issue debated: "assuming
> that the host administrator has programmed the host to change its MAC
> address before visiting network X, can we guarantee that the IPv6 IID
> does not leak information about the identity of the host."

My simple answer would be "Depends on the algorithm employed to
generated the IID".

For example, if you do the traditional SLAAC IIDs, "randomizing the MAC
adress" would essentially mitigate the privacy/security issues related
with IPv6 addressing.

OTOH, if the node implements Microsoft's scheme (randomized but constant
IIDs along the life of the node), then I'd expect to randomized MACs to
just mitigate the MAC-tracking issue. (I don't think they regenerate the
IID when the NIC is replaced.. buy I might be wrong).

P.S.: While we won't be able to commit any of these before the IETF
meeting, I will craft some text and post it here for discussion asap.

Thanks!

Cheers,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492