The SEAL IPv6 Destination Option

"Templin, Fred L" <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com> Mon, 16 January 2012 15:51 UTC

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From: "Templin, Fred L" <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>
To: "ipv6@ietf.org" <ipv6@ietf.org>, Sreenatha setty <sreenatha.b@huawei.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2012 07:51:37 -0800
Subject: The SEAL IPv6 Destination Option
Thread-Topic: The SEAL IPv6 Destination Option
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I  am renaming this thread to the new title of the document. Here is the
abstract  and document URL :

  "The Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL) provides a
   mid-layer header designed for the encapsulation of an inner network
   layer packet within outer network layer headers.  SEAL also supports
   a transport mode of operation, where the inner payload corresponds to
   an ordinary transport layer payload.  However, SEAL can also provide
   benefit when used as an IPv6 destination option that contains a
   digital signature inserted by the source.  The source can thereafter
   use the signature to verify that any ICMPv6 messages received
   actually came from a router on the path, while destinations that
   share a secret key with the source can verify the signature to ensure
   data origin authentication."

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-templin-sealopt/

Thanks - Fred
fred.l.templin@boeing.com