RE: Packets leaking and escaping from domains ....

"Manfredi (US), Albert E" <albert.e.manfredi@boeing.com> Mon, 11 May 2020 00:47 UTC

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From: "Manfredi (US), Albert E" <albert.e.manfredi@boeing.com>
To: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>, Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
CC: 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Packets leaking and escaping from domains ....
Thread-Topic: Packets leaking and escaping from domains ....
Thread-Index: AQHWJq6XbfhVDig73UaKlznlVBq49qihn58AgAABP4CAAEJLAIAABxwAgABb9oD//8O0UA==
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 00:47:21 +0000
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-----Original Message-----
From: ipv6 <ipv6-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Brian E Carpenter

> I agree with you that the worst consequence is dropped packets, if they leak. But debugging connection failures of this kind is essentially impossible and can drive users and help desks crazy. Who is inserting an SRH in my packet and then sending it on to the outside world? Where is the tiny configuration error that causes this? (Maybe there's a corner case bug in the PSP code?)
>
> That's why the ecapsulation model is fundamentally better; it limits the problem to the encap/decap tunnel by construction, and leaked SRHs simply cannot happen.

+1.

Following through the arguments pro and con, in this long thread, including arguments along the lines of what people do in the privacy of their own bedrooms. It's seems to be a case of someone doing something fundamentally funky, but wanting to get a blessing for doing so.

Why ask for a blessing? If a user is experiencing some inexplicable problem, and the user's network domain, or the destination's domain, are doing unnatural acts, the onus of debugging should fall immediately on that questionable practice.

There are other examples of individual companies creating their own proprietary tricks, without necessarily asking for a blessing. And yes, they do cause problems. Just look at the special, clever tricks, a long and diverse list, involved in IGMP snooping.

Bert