[Isms] Comments on draft-ietf-isms-secshell-07.txt
"David B. Nelson" <d.b.nelson@comcast.net> Wed, 27 June 2007 21:58 UTC
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From: "David B. Nelson" <d.b.nelson@comcast.net>
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Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2007 17:58:44 -0400
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Subject: [Isms] Comments on draft-ietf-isms-secshell-07.txt
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In section 3.1.3: It is also possible to use a different password validation protocol such as CHAP [RFC1994] or digest authentication [RFC 2617, draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-04] to integrate with RADIUS or Diameter. These mechanisms leave the password in the clear on the device that is authenticating the password which introduces threats to the authentication infrastructure. Note that draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-04 has been published as RFC 4590. This is currently under revision, to fix a couple or errors, as draft-ietf-radext-rfc4590bis-01.txt. In the second sentence I would recommend changing "leave" to "require". _______________________________________________ Isms mailing list Isms@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/isms
- [Isms] Comments on draft-ietf-isms-secshell-07.txt David B. Nelson
- RE: [Isms] Comments on draft-ietf-isms-secshell-0… David Harrington
- RE: [Isms] Comments on draft-ietf-isms-secshell-0… David Harrington
- RE: [Isms] Comments on draft-ietf-isms-secshell-0… David B. Nelson
- RE: [Isms] Comments on draft-ietf-isms-secshell-0… David Harrington