Re: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard

Paragon Initiative Enterprises Security Team <security@paragonie.com> Fri, 31 March 2017 15:49 UTC

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From: Paragon Initiative Enterprises Security Team <security@paragonie.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 11:49:11 -0400
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To: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, jose@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard
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On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 11:46 AM, Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 1:52 PM, Paragon Initiative Enterprises
> Security Team <security@paragonie.com> wrote:
>

​(SNIP)
​

>
>
Yes, it would be nice if the standard was less fragile in this area.
> But you're asking for a major change to an existing standard after it
> is published and many interoperable implementations exist. You have to
> realize this is a (very) hard sell.
>

​The alternative is to tell people don't use JOSE, it's a bad standard
<https://paragonie.com/blog/2017/03/jwt-json-web-tokens-is-bad-standard-that-everyone-should-avoid>
and design a superior alternative to recommend instead. One that has
actually been vetted by cryptography experts.​

​Given only those two options, which would you rather see?

Security Team
Paragon Initiative Enterprises <https://paragonie.com/security>​