Re: [jose] AESWrap vs ECB key wrap

"Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com> Tue, 07 August 2012 19:04 UTC

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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: "'Manger, James H'" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, jose@ietf.org
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Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2012 12:02:46 -0700
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Subject: Re: [jose] AESWrap vs ECB key wrap
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Manger, James H
> Sent: Thursday, August 02, 2012 12:17 AM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] AESWrap vs ECB key wrap
> 
> I noticed an "ECB key wrap" option was discussed at the IETF meeting, as
an
> alternative to AESWrap [RFC 3394].
> 
> I hadn't looked closely at AESWrap before. Its important features seem to
> be:
> 1. Only defined for content keys that are a multiple of 64-bits 2. Adds an
> overhead of 64 bits (= 8 bytes = 12 B64 chars) 3. Offers a 64-bit
integrity check
> (from the overhead) 4. Performs 12 AES operations for each 64-bits of the
> content key

Do you believe that there is an issue with saying that key sizes are going
to be a multiple of 64 bits?  If so please speak up now and we can change
this

> 
> I assume an ECB key wrap, in contrast, would avoid the 64-bit overhead by
> dropping the integrity check and only use 1/24th of the AES operations.
> Would it also use, say, ciphertext stealing so there is no size overhead
for any
> content key size?

There however is an issue where you cannot encrypt more than 128-bits of key
material.  This means that it would not be usable for many algorithms that
are in the current specification.

> 
> If a 12 byte overhead (when base64url-encoded) is too small to worry about
> (and an extra, say, 46 AES operations is immaterial), then JOSE should
keep
> AESWrap as the only choice. It still need to define how to use AESWrap for
> content keys that are not a multiple of 64-bits. Perhaps one byte of the
> integrity check is changed to indicate the content key length?
> 
> If size is going to be absolutely crucial for some use cases, then an ECB
key
> wrap could help. Such a size-constrained situation would probably need
> other changes as well, such as the choice of a shorted IV and integrity
tag for
> AES-GCM (than the 128-bits and 96-bits picked in JWA).
> 
> --
> James Manger
> 
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