[jose] Rationale for keeping the JWS "none" algorithm

[Anders Rundgren <[e-mail]>]

A reason for keeping the "none" algorithms is because JWS is an intrusive scheme where the signature container effectively becomes the primary "message".  If you want messages to only OPTIONALLY be signed you get a rather quirky system unless you have a "none" algorithm.

Cleartext JWS (https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-erdtman-jose-cleartext-jws-00.html) OTOH, doesn't need a "none" algorithm since an unsigned message simply wouldn't contain a signature property.

Unsigned Message:
   {
     "mydata":...
   }

Message Signed with Cleartext JWS:
   {
     "mydata":...,
     "signature": {
           ....
     }
   }

BTW, if the verifier doesn't enforce a policy including accepted Algorithms, Keys to trust, Key identification mechanisms, Anticipated extensions etc. all bets are off for any signature solution even if the signature software is "perfect" :-)

Anders