Re: [jose] JWS Unencoded Payload Option spec addressing WGLC comments

"Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com> Wed, 21 October 2015 22:55 UTC

Return-Path: <ietf@augustcellars.com>
X-Original-To: jose@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: jose@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9E281B3363 for <jose@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 21 Oct 2015 15:55:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 2.161
X-Spam-Level: **
X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.161 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, HTTPS_HTTP_MISMATCH=1.989, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, URI_NO_WWW_INFO_CGI=2.071] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id U3mCTPN389eF for <jose@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 21 Oct 2015 15:55:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp4.pacifier.net (smtp4.pacifier.net [64.255.237.176]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BC7E11B3362 for <jose@ietf.org>; Wed, 21 Oct 2015 15:55:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hebrews (winery.augustcellars.com [206.212.239.129]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: jimsch@nwlink.com) by smtp4.pacifier.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2AA1338EEC; Wed, 21 Oct 2015 15:55:27 -0700 (PDT)
From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: 'Mike Jones' <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, "'Manger, James'" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, jose@ietf.org
References: <BY2PR03MB4425B29243487BC32294D1AF5300@BY2PR03MB442.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> <255B9BB34FB7D647A506DC292726F6E13BB0623AFD@WSMSG3153V.srv.dir.telstra.com> <BY2PR03MB442B7AF9F413BDB8626EC06F5380@BY2PR03MB442.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
In-Reply-To: <BY2PR03MB442B7AF9F413BDB8626EC06F5380@BY2PR03MB442.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 15:52:45 -0700
Message-ID: <06ac01d10c53$338a3710$9a9ea530$@augustcellars.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_06AD_01D10C18.872CBEA0"
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 15.0
Content-Language: en-us
Thread-Index: AQIUQlbBXbko3FqiXWowZorfE22UeQIK6AZaATMJDJCd1jGuIA==
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/jose/PyGjQLm9rOXAkDEf0gvbHRK_sDk>
Subject: Re: [jose] JWS Unencoded Payload Option spec addressing WGLC comments
X-BeenThere: jose@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Javascript Object Signing and Encryption <jose.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/jose>, <mailto:jose-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/jose/>
List-Post: <mailto:jose@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:jose-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose>, <mailto:jose-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 22:55:31 -0000

Does making 'crit' not required open one up to the possibility of an attack
along the following lines:

 

1.       Create a JWS with a b64=true header

2.      Sign it using the b64=false construction

3.      Send it to a validator that does not understand the b64 header.

4.      Claim that the validator should have failed validation and not
performed the signed command

 

Jim

 

 

From: jose [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mike Jones
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 2:16 PM
To: Manger, James <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>; jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] JWS Unencoded Payload Option spec addressing WGLC
comments

 

As I see it, explicitly updating JWS isn't necessary, since JWS established
the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registry to allow
for additional Header Parameters to be defined, and so implementers are
expected to refer to the registry and gracefully handle the possibility of
extensions registered there.  The JWS Unencoded Payload Option specification
registers such an extension.

 

As to whether "crit" is required, "crit" is only necessary if an explicit
directive is required that the validation must fail if the header parameter
is not understood.  However, in this case, if "b64" is not understood and
simply ignored, the validation will fail without needing to use "crit",
since the signature validation will fail.  Thus, the use of "crit" is
unnecessary for "b64".

 

                                                                -- Mike

 

From: Manger, James [mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2015 7:55 PM
To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com
<mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> >; jose@ietf.org <mailto:jose@ietf.org>

Subject: RE: JWS Unencoded Payload Option spec addressing WGLC comments

 

Shouldn't draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options update RFC 7515 "JWS"?
That seems quite important as draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options
changes the meaning of valid JWS messages (new "b64" field that cannot be
ignored, but is not listed in "crit"), and allows a bunch of previously
invalid chars in JWS Compact Serializations (invalidating the JWS definition
of Compact Serialization as a "URL-safe string").

 

--

James Manger

 

From: jose [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Mike Jones
Sent: Wednesday, 14 October 2015 10:49 AM
To: jose@ietf.org <mailto:jose@ietf.org> 
Subject: [jose] JWS Unencoded Payload Option spec addressing WGLC comments

 

Draft -03 of the JWS Unencoded Payload Option specification addresses the
working group last call comments received.  Thanks to Jim Schaad, Vladimir
Dzhuvinov, John Bradley, and Nat Sakimura for the useful comments.  Changes
were:

*         Allowed the ASCII space character and all printable ASCII
characters other than period ('.') in non-detached unencoded payloads using
the JWS Compact Serialization. 

*         Updated the abstract to say that that the spec updates RFC 7519. 

*         Removed unused references. 

*         Changed the change controller to IESG.

 

The specification is available at:

*
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-03
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf
.org%2fhtml%2fdraft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-03&data=01%7c01%7cMi
chael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c67566ac2856449dd329b08d2d442d2c8%7c72f988bf86f
141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=cwfExLlgEK11IEBTdvKI63EI6xNBi1JTV0KVipTf8JU%
3d> 

 

An HTML formatted version is also available at:

*
http://self-issued.info/docs/draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-03.ht
ml
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fself-issued
.info%2fdocs%2fdraft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-03.html&data=01%7c0
1%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c67566ac2856449dd329b08d2d442d2c8%7c72f98
8bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=5nAlXMo6uPDM600pp0Kf1JQliQ4maLZc5eCMKf
zCdQ8%3d> 

 

                                                                -- Mike

 

P.S.  This note was also published at http://self-issued.info/?p=1465
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fself-issued
.info%2f%3fp%3d1465&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c67566ac28
56449dd329b08d2d442d2c8%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=L6oZmQ6
tOl1eW%2fmh9zyorKeY4ouQZTGMn4o9Zid5snk%3d>  and as @selfissued
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftwitter.co
m%2fselfissued&data=01%7c01%7cmichael.jones%40microsoft.com%7c3a69db7b8b6c4d
47da0f08d2937a3d82%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=ggurSMkRVW%2
bR8Nv93Mnbsf16CmVGqfjB9lW8SV5gAKM%3d> .