Re: [jose] JWK glitches in deployment

Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com> Tue, 26 August 2014 16:56 UTC

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Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 09:56:43 -0700
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From: Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore@salesforce.com>
To: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] JWK glitches in deployment
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We probably could have benefited from language in the spec calling out the
leading zero byte as an area of concern.    That said our ecosystem
detected it pretty quickly and after some collaborate with Microsoft, we
have a fix due out this week, so the growing pains are sorting themselves
out rather quickly.

-cmort


On Mon, Aug 25, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Manger, James <
James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote:

> In March, Google’s JWK file https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v2/certs
> (used for OpenID Connect) had 3 bugs: base64 instead of base64url; 1024-bit
> instead of >=2048-bit; leading zero byte on moduli.
>
> Today Google’s JWK file has 1 different bug: the base64url encoding has a
> trailing “=”.
>
> Salesforce’s JWK file https://login.salesforce.com/id/keys has 1 bug: a
> leading zero byte on the RSA moduli.
>
>
>
> Are these just teething problems, or do we need a stronger warning in the
> spec. These bugs also change the JWK’s thumbprint (another reminder not to
> base security on thumbprints being unique for a given key).
>
>
>
> --
>
> James Manger
>
>
>