Re: [jose] Minutes

[Mike Jones <[e-mail]>]

"Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data" (the title of issue #4) is a false statement.  Nat pointed that out over a month ago in the issue tracker.  If that remains the title of the issue, it should be closed on the merits of the issue.

If you want to change the title of this one to "Should the encrypted key element of a JWE no longer be included in the integrity check?" I'd have no problem with the issue, because then it would be making a neutral statement about a possible change.  But right now, it's highly misleading, at best.

None of that was captured in the minutes, even though it was all discussed in Orlando.

                                                            -- Mike

From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 3:11 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: Jim Schaad; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [jose] Minutes

It's not accurate to say that Issue #4 is not a problem.  We did clarify in the meeting that the issue could use some re-statement, to clarify that the issue is the coverage of keys by the integrity check.  So there's still an issue, namely whether the key needs to be covered by the integrity check.


On Sun, Mar 24, 2013 at 9:02 PM, Mike Jones <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
I don't believe that the minutes adequately capture the discussion on issue #4 (http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4#<http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/4>).  I would revise as follows:

Data tracker issue #4 (Impossible to separate wrapped key from encrypted data) - John Bradley's slides pointed out that it *is* possible to separate wrapped keys from encrypted data when needed by using the direct encryption mode and therefore asked for this issue to be closed, as it is based upon a false premise.  Mike Jones also asked for this to be closed on this basis, and pointed out that Nat Sakimura had already described the problem with this issue in the issue tracker.  Richard asked a question about the security analysis of including the wrapped key in the integrity calculation - Does the wrapped key need to be included in the integrity check or not?  The question will be referred to CFRG but a request for possible attack modes being sent to the list is requested.

Given that the problem stated in issue #4 was demonstrated to not actually be a problem during the discussions, I would ask again that the chairs close this one, and update the minutes to reflect this.

                                                            Thank you,
                                                            -- Mike

From: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]> [mailto:[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>] On Behalf Of Jim Schaad
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2013 1:12 PM
To: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>
Subject: [jose] Minutes

Preliminary minutes have been uploaded to the site.  Please review and comment back to me if you have disagreements.

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/86/minutes/minutes-86-jose

Note that the minutes have an action list at the bottom of them.

Jim


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