Re: [jose] Working Group last call on draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 23 January 2015 23:13 UTC

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Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2015 23:12:57 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: ⌘ Matt Miller <mamille2@cisco.com>, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, Michael Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
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Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] Working Group last call on draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint
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On 23/01/15 21:50, ⌘ Matt Miller wrote:
> Or maybe we seriously consider SPKI.

Yes. It works. It's used elsewhere so offers better
interop. All libraries support it so coding up the
thumbprint stuff with that is trivial and far less
error prone. It avoids any need for (even more)
pointless debate about hash-input nitpicking. There's
less spec text needed too. All useful asymmetric
algs will have a well defined SPKI for the next
decade because those are used in TLS and for the
WebPKI which is not going away no matter how much
you want it to go away. That is a pile of advantages.

And, most important, there is zero advantage in
pointlessly inventing a new variation. Frankly the
supposed advantages offered so far:

- - a line or two less code, (maybe, maybe not,
  unimportant in any case)
- - "not asn.1" (nonsense, SPKI needs no generic
  asn.1 support, we've known for decades how
  to do without that, and your library constructs
  the octets from the key already)
- - "it should be json" (more nonsense, it's a hash
  input and never sent or stored, nobody cares what
  format it has)

...are utterly unconvincing in any rational view.

S.

PS: As another data point, the W3C sub-resource
integrity spec [1] uses ni URIs today. I've no idea
if that's likely to last into a W3C REC or get
deployed, but seems to me like not-reinventing in
this space is one sensible thing those folks have
(sensibly:-) done, given the utter lack of benefit
from re-inventing.

[1] http://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/
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