[karp] Cryptographic Authentication Algorithm Implementation Best Practices for Routing Protocols

Manav Bhatia <manavbhatia@gmail.com> Wed, 11 November 2009 12:23 UTC

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Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2009 17:54:06 +0530
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From: Manav Bhatia <manavbhatia@gmail.com>
To: karp@ietf.org
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Subject: [karp] Cryptographic Authentication Algorithm Implementation Best Practices for Routing Protocols
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Hi,

We have posted the revised version based on the feedback that we had
received from OPSEC and its available here:

http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-bhatia-manral-igp-crypto-requirements-04.txt

Would be great if folks in KARP go through this and provide some feedback.

Abstract

The routing protocols Open Shortest Path First version 2
(OSPFv2)[RFC2328], Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS)
[ISO] [RFC1195] and Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [RFC2453]
currently define Clear Text and MD5 (Message Digest 5) [RFC1321]
methods for authenticating protocol packets. Recently effort has been
made to add support for the SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) family of hash
functions for the purpose of authenticating routing protocol packets
for RIP [RFC4822], IS-IS [RFC5310] and OSPF [RFC5709].

To encourage interoperability between disparate implementations, it is
imperative that we specify the expected minimal set of algorithms
thereby ensuring that there is at least one algorithm that all
implementations will have in common.

This document examines the current set of available algorithms with
interoperability and effective cryptographic authentication protection
being the principle considerations. Cryptographic authentication of
these routing protocols requires the availability of the same
algorithms in disparate implementations. It is desirable that newly
specified algorithms should be implemented and available in routing
protocol implementations because they may be promoted to requirements
at some future time.

Cheers, Manav