Re: [KEYPROV] PROTOWRITEUPfor draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-07

"Bajaj, Siddharth" <SBajaj@verisign.com> Wed, 03 March 2010 18:24 UTC

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Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2010 10:21:31 -0800
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Thread-Topic: [KEYPROV] PROTOWRITEUPfor draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-07
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From: "Bajaj, Siddharth" <SBajaj@verisign.com>
To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>, Philip Hoyer <phoyer@actividentity.com>
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Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] PROTOWRITEUPfor draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-07
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Hi Anders, 
 
I'll beg to differ you with you - several OATH members including VeriSign have implemented drafts of the online provisioning protocol in their products today. 
 
Others are waiting for this standard to be finalized so that they can implement the final versions. 
Thanks,
 
Siddharth

________________________________

From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of Anders Rundgren
Sent: Wed 3/3/2010 8:43 AM
To: Philip Hoyer
Cc: keyprov@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] PROTOWRITEUPfor draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-07



Philip Hoyer wrote:
> And how is that redundant to an openly discussed peer reviewed agreed
> IETF standard that RSA has also contributed to?

There has indeed been open discussions regarding the *content* of
draft.  However, there has not been much open discussions regarding
*utility* and *deployment*, something which I feel has hampered the
entire KEYPROV effort.

Why would anybody in their right mind use on-line provisioning with
DSKPP for discrete OTP tokens?  Isn't sort of half the value with OTP
*getting away* from middleware?

RSA, VeriSign, Nicrosoft, IBM etc have contributed to many standards but
not all of them have been successful in the marketplace.

Anders

>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
> To: Philip Hoyer
> Cc: turners@ieca.com <turners@ieca.com>; keyprov@ietf.org <keyprov@ietf.org>
> Sent: Wed Mar 03 17:10:46 2010
> Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] PROTO WRITEUPfor
> draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-07
>
> Philip Hoyer wrote:
>  > Redundant to what exactly?
>
> I believe I elaborated that in my initial posting.
>
> RSA have had seeds distributed in XML format for ages and they work
> on multiple platforms including mobile phones.
>
>
> Anders
>
>  >
>  >
>  > ----- Original Message -----
>  > From: keyprov-bounces@ietf.org <keyprov-bounces@ietf.org>
>  > To: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
>  > Cc: keyprov@ietf.org <keyprov@ietf.org>
>  > Sent: Wed Mar 03 15:54:36 2010
>  > Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] PROTO WRITEUPfor
>  > draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-07
>  >
>  > Sean Turner wrote:
>  >  > Anders,
>  >  >
>  >  > PSKC is the mandatory to implement key package and nobody, that I am
>  >  > aware of, is trying to change that.  The container defined in
>  >  > draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-07 is optional to implement.
>  >
>  > I just said that it felt like a redundant solution.
>  >
>  > /anders
>  >
>  >
>  >  >
>  >  > spt
>  >  >
>  >  > Anders Rundgren wrote:
>  >  >> The document is great from a technical point of view.
>  >  >>
>  >  >> The utility is questionable since PSKC does the same
>  >  >> thing and also interopes with DSKPP.  The rationale
>  >  >> (which has been mentioned but not been put on paper)
>  >  >> "cards cannot process XML" is true but provisioning
>  >  >> generally relies on middleware doing the unpacking
>  >  >> and then through some API inserting keys and attributes
>  >  >> in the card.
>  >  >>
>  >  >> Creating tokens that would decipher CMS is technically
>  >  >> doable but there is absolutely no point with that
>  >  >>
>  >  >> In case you want to know how you can deal with XML,
>  >  >> secure transfer of secrets, and still keep the token
>  >  >> device unaware of sophisticated data structures and
>  >  >> public key verification you may take a peek in the
>  >  >> following document:
>  >  >>
>  >  >> "setPiggybackedSymmetricKey"
>  >  >>
>  >  >> http://webpki.org/papers/keygen2/sks-api-arch.pdf <https://connect.verisign.com/papers/keygen2/,DanaInfo=.awfdsonFvzp+sks-api-arch.pdf> 
>  >  >>
>  >  >> Anders
>  >  >> _______________________________________________
>  >  >> KEYPROV mailing list
>  >  >> KEYPROV@ietf.org
>  >  >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov <https://connect.verisign.com/mailman/listinfo/,DanaInfo=.awxyCmjzmHx1r,SSL+keyprov> 
>  >  >>
>  >  >
>  >
>  > _______________________________________________
>  > KEYPROV mailing list
>  > KEYPROV@ietf.org
>  > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyprov <https://connect.verisign.com/mailman/listinfo/,DanaInfo=.awxyCmjzmHx1r,SSL+keyprov> 
>  >
>

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