[KEYPROV] Reflector Issue

["Scott Kipp" <[e-mail]>]

Is there a problem with this email reflector or why are Vol 16, Issue 15
and Vol 16, Issue 16 the same email?

I seem to get repeat emails.

Thanks,
Scott 

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Today's Topics:

   1. Re:  [pskc] Latest draft of PSKC - no more name value pairs
      (Philip Hoyer)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2008 10:55:27 +0200
From: "Philip Hoyer" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: [KEYPROV] [pskc] Latest draft of PSKC - no more name
	value pairs
To: "Pei, Mingliang" <[e-mail]>, <[e-mail]>,
	"Hannes Tschofenig" <[e-mail]>,
"Hallam-Baker,
	Phillip" <[e-mail]>, <[e-mail]>,
	<[e-mail]>
Cc: [e-mail]
Message-ID:
	
<[e-mail]
rd.com>
	
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

Ming,

Thanks for the time to help out first.

 

On the matter of URIs I actually agree with you and we should change the
current spec to become:

 

HOTP: URI: http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp
<http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp> 

OCRA: URI:
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#OCRA-1:(ocra_suite_parameters)

TOTP: URI: http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#totp

 

 

Since PSKC is mainly to transmit keys regarding a specific use I do not
think we need to have the OCRA '-' means all approach. One will always
have specific OCRA suite parameters.

 

 

- Should we also use ExtensionsType in KeyDataType in place of the
following?

 

<xs:any namespace="##other" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>

 

 

No I strongly believe we should NOT do this here because of the
consistency of the subelement structure. 

 

Everything underneath KeyData follows:

<elementName>

            <PlainValue>

            <ENcryptedValue>

</elementName>

 

If we would add an Extensions tag this consistent structure would be
broken.

 

- Should we recommend <ValueMAC> in all key data where value is
encrypted? In particular, should we add a ValueMAC for secxzgzbret data
in PBE based example 11.4?
We had it in v1.3.
I prefer to add it.

 

No we really discussed this with Magnus, ValueMAC should only be there
for algorithms where integrity checks are not built in. Actually our
examples using AES CBC from my understanding have integrity checks built
into the algorithm so we would not need this either.

Maybe it would be better to have a recommendation for which algorithms
it should be there. Do you have an idea of which supported algorithms do
have built in integrity checks?

 

- Element name for type xs:ID

 

KeyPropertiesId in <KeyPropertiesType>
Id in <DerivedKeyType>

 

Shall we also change them to "ID" for consistency?

 

Yes you are right KeypropertisId should be just 'ID' I will change this.

 

- Section 5.2 The following sentence doesn't sound smooth:

 

      "KeyAlgorithm (OPTIONAL), the unique URI of the type of algorithm
      to use with the secret key, for profiles are described in
      Section 6.3"

 

Should it be

 

      "KeyAlgorithm (OPTIONAL), the unique URI of the type of algorithm
      to use with a secret key for the profiles described in
      Section 6.3"

 

Agree will change it

 

Philip

 

________________________________

From: Pei, Mingliang [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2008 6:47 AM
To: Philip Hoyer; [e-mail]; Hannes Tschofenig;
Hallam-Baker, Phillip; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Cc: [e-mail]
Subject: RE: [KEYPROV] [pskc] Latest draft of PSKC - no more name value
pairs

 

Hi Philip,

 

Here are some of my comments on the draft and a few minor fixes made.
See the attached version including my few changes.


Comments:

 

- Three issues with regard to defining algorithm URI: 

 

1. Shouldn't we use a permanent URI should be used instead of file
location? For example

 

TOTP and OCRA algorithm URI is defined by their current v00 RFC draft
URL. When the draft changes, we have to change the URI again.

 

URI:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-00.txt
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-00.txt>


OCRA:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mraihi-mutual-oath-hotp-varian
ts-07.txt#OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:C-QN08
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mraihi-mutual-oath-hotp-varia
nts-07.txt#OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:C-QN08> 

 

2. Consistency

 

HOTP: URI: http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp
<http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp>
TOTP: URI: <RFC doc URL>

 

Let us use either the RFC URL (when final) or the style of HOTP as
above. Considering that hmac-sha1 URI isn't necessarily defined by its
RFC URL

 

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt

 

but

 

http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1

 

we don't have to use RFC draft URL for URI. We may continue to use the
pattern for HOTP to define TOTP and OCRA as follows for a consistent
approach.

 

HOTP  URI: http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#totp
<http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#totp> 

OCRA URI: http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:C-QN08

 

The pros of this pattern is the URI doesn't attach to a moving URL from
draft to draft. The cons is that the URI is somehow associated with
pskc.

 

Suggest to track this an issue to discuss during IETF-72.

 

3. OCRA URI definition with regard to the parameters

 

OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:C-QN08

 

Shall we just use "-" for all?

Shall we list all options for registration here or we want the IANA to
look at the OCRA document to find all options?

 

- Should we also use ExtensionsType in KeyDataType in place of the
following?

 

<xs:any namespace="##other" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>

 

- Should we recommend <ValueMAC> in all key data where value is
encrypted? In particular, should we add a ValueMAC for secxzgzbret data
in PBE based example 11.4?
We had it in v1.3.
I prefer to add it.

 

- Element name for type xs:ID

 

KeyPropertiesId in <KeyPropertiesType>
Id in <DerivedKeyType>

 

Shall we also change them to "ID" for consistency?

 

- Section 5.2 The following sentence doesn't sound smooth:

 

      "KeyAlgorithm (OPTIONAL), the unique URI of the type of algorithm
      to use with the secret key, for profiles are described in
      Section 6.3"

 

Should it be

 

      "KeyAlgorithm (OPTIONAL), the unique URI of the type of algorithm
      to use with a secret key for the profiles described in
      Section 6.3"

 

- Changes made:

 

1. Section 11.4 and 11.5 Example change:

 

<PlainValue>0</PlainValue>

 

to

 

<pskc:PlainValue>0</pskc:PlainValue>

 

2. Change all occurence of pskc:ExtensionType to pskc:ExtensionsType

 

- Ming


 

________________________________

From: Philip Hoyer [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2008 7:39 AM
To: Pei, Mingliang; [e-mail]; Hannes Tschofenig;
Hallam-Baker, Phillip; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Cc: [e-mail]
Subject: RE: [KEYPROV] [pskc] Latest draft of PSKC - no more name value
pairs

 

Another day another edition.

 

I realized that the IntegerDataType was actually creating BigIntegers in
java since it was of type xs:integer and hence have changed it to xs:int
to more reflect what we need. And I have also renamed it to intDataType
to be in line with the longDataType used for counters.

 

The OCRA example was also corrected and some nits from Sean Turner abut
different spelling of crypto modules in the use cases.

 

Philip

 

 

Please find attached the latest work in progress draft and related
schema after the additions that address Robert Philpott's latest
comments (if they resulted in  changes to existing changes from draft
-04 they have been prefixed [UPDATE]),

 

TODOs:

1.	Hannes to change the IANA section relating XML tag registry
since not needed anymore 
2.	Review the spec (Salah, Hannes, Andrea) especially the wording
around the new changes (please see KeyData Element definition in the new
spec) 
3.	Add additional elements under KeyData based on input from Rob
Philpot 
4.	Review extension points are correct 

 

Changes made from version 4 are:

 

1.	[UPDATE] Added optional Id element to the container in case
another document includes more than one container and wants to reference
it uniquely, this is of type xs:Id named 'ID' 
2.	Made PINKeyId of PINPolicy optional (in version 4 it wrongly
became mandatory) 
3.	Changed KeyPropertiesType:KeyPropertiesId from type xs:String to
xs:ID 
4.	[UPDATE] Changed KeyType:KeyPropertiesId from type xs:string to
be of type xs:IDREF as it refers to the ID of the element of (3) see
directly above, also renamed to simply KeyProperties 
5.	[UPDATE] Removed PINPolicyId as not needed, Added optional
PINPolicyId attribute of type xs:ID to PINPolicyType - 
6.	Added the KeyContainer:KeyProperties element that was missing
from version -04 (oversight).This is where the common properties for a
key are actually held within a container 
7.	Changed PINPolicyType: WrongPINtry into WrongPINTry so that it
is proper camel-case but the discussed naming and changed to
'MaxFailedAttempts' 
8.	Changed PINUsageMode 'InAlgo' to 'Algorithmic' 
9.	Added description for added extension points (see below) 
10.	Changed DeviceIdType to DeviceInfoType (please see other email
for rational to keep separate type and not move elements directly under
Device) 
11.	Moved Keyporperties in front of device under KeyContainer for
more readability 
12.	Changed Namespace as per Hannes proposal from
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" to
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc:1.0" 
13.	Cleaned up the way that attributes (no angled brackets) and
elements (angled brackets <elementName>) are described in the spec 
14.	Corrected some spelling and grammar 
15.	Changed schema and spec to new proposal that removes name value
pairs 
16.	Added OCRA URI to the spec and added an example 
17.	Added TOTP URI to the spec and added an example 
18.	Added an example of KeyProperties 
19.	Added 'Append' to PIN for completeness. 
20.	Corrected the wrong 'MANDATORY' in the usage description of
KeyType and KeyPropertiesType 
21.	Added the following comment the elements of type xs:dateTime:
"MUST be expressed in UTC form, with no time zone component.
Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on time resolution finer than
milliseconds and MUST NOT generate time instants that specify leap
seconds." 
22.	Moved StartDates before ExpiryDates for easier readability 
23.	Added the following sub-elements to PINPolicyType 

	a.	<MinLength (OPTIONAL)>, the minimum lenght of a PIN that
can be set to protect this key. It MUST not be possible to set a PIN
shorter than this value. If the Format element is 'DECIMAL',
'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this value indicates the number of
digits/characters. If the Format attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this
value indicates the number of bytes of the unencoded value. 
	b.	<MaxLength (OPTIONAL)>, the maximum lenght of a PIN that
can be set to protect this key. It MUST not be possible to set a PIN
longer than this value. If the Format element is 'DECIMAL',
'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this value indicates the number of
digits/characters. If the Format attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this
value indicates the number of bytes of the unencoded value. 
	c.	<Format (OPTIONAL)>, defines the format of the PIN and
MUST be one of the values defined in Section 5.4.3 

24.	 

 

 

[Update] Extension points:

 

Changed to model proposed by Rob Philpott declaring a new type:

 

            <xs:complexType name="ExtensionsType">

              <xs:sequence>

                        <xs:any namespace="##other"
processContents="lax" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>

              </xs:sequence>

              <xs:attribute name="definition" type="xs:anyURI"
use="optional"/>

            </xs:complexType>

 

Which has been added as "<xs:element name="Extensions"
type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>"

To:

1.	KeyContainerType 
2.	KeyPropertiesType 
3.	KeyType 
4.	PINPolicy 
5.	DeviceInfoType 
6.	DeviceType 
7.	UsageType 

 

Please NOTE that KeyData still has the existing "<xs:any
namespace="##other" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>"

Because of the special nature of the KeyData element and subelements

 

PINUsageMode too maintains the existing   "<xs:any namespace="##other"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>"

Being an extensible enumeration

 

Added a '<xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other"/>' to:

1.	UsageType (since it contains the attributes of '


<xs:attribute name="OTP" type="xs:boolean" default="false"/>

                        <xs:attribute name="CR" type="xs:boolean"
default="false"/>

                        <xs:attribute name="Integrity" type="xs:boolean"
default="false"/>

                        <xs:attribute name="Encrypt" type="xs:boolean"
default="false"/>

                        <xs:attribute name="Unlock" type="xs:boolean"
default="false"/>

            So I thought it would be wise to be able to extend this

 

 

 

 

 

Outstanding issues that need to be discussed:

1.	Most of the examples have been hand-composed in XML  so not
verified 
2.	Some examples use explicit 'pskc:' namespace not sure we need to
do this but maybe we should be consistent 

 

 

Philip

 

 

 

________________________________

From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Friday, May 30, 2008 4:36 PM
To: [e-mail]
Cc: Philip Hoyer
Subject: FW: [KEYPROV] [pskc] Latest draft of PSKC

 

Here is Philip Hoyer's response to Rob's comments (see below), which we
initially handled offline, and then we decided it would be better to
further the discussion on the mailing list.  

-- Andrea


 1.       Use of xs:ID attributes:

a.       The xs:ID datatype is only used in the DerivedKeyType
complexType.  xs:ID is the preferred mechanism for referring to other
XML elements in an instance document.  So why are custom attributes
defined to be able to referto elements of the types KeyPropertiesType
(the "KeyPropertiesId" attribute) and KeyType ("KeyId")? Why don't these
use xs:ID attributes?

[PH] good point I was thinking that xs:Id for KeyPropertiesId could be a
good choice  The KeyId on the other hand is not really used to be
referred to. Do you think it would be better to use xs:ID for this
aswell? And in case we use it now is it backwards compatible to what we
have? 


b.      Why doesn't a KeyContainer have an (optional) ID that could be
used to reference it in an instance document?

[PH] valid comment and I will think we should add this 

c.       Same question for PINPolicy?

[PH] agreed

d.      The use of the DeviceIdType is inconsistent with other "ID"'s
(that are used for referential information).  The elements in the
DeviceIDType seem more appropriate for the DeviceType or KeyType
elements.  At a minimum, I would not call this a "DeviceIdType" (perhaps
"DeviceInfoType"?) but really, I would just put its elements directly in
the DeviceType complexType).  I would also give <Device> elements an
optional referential ID via xs:ID.

[PH] so basically you are saying that any high level entity (Key,
Device, KeyContainer etc) should have an ID that is xs:ID? The thought
of DeviceId was to aggregate under a specific type the elements that
comprise the compound key to look up the device


e.      Section 5.2.1 says that the DeviceIdType is an extensible type,
but there are no extension points in it.

[PH] agreed I think we should add an xs:any

2.       We are really unhappy with the proposed extensibility
mechanism. This goes against general XML schema best practice. Defining
extension points via xs:any/xs:anyAttribute is vastly superior (IMO):

[PH] this has been extensively discussed at IETF and there are pros and
cons for all approaches. The pro's of the name value approach is that it
will be re-usable for the ASN.1 spec and that we will have a semantic
registry defined by IANA.



a.       The use of "Reserved data attribute names" as described in
section 7 is really difficult to work with. First, <Data> elements
should ONLY be used for "real" extensions... i.e. things that aren't
already known at the time the spec is written.  If we already know that
the items defined in section 7 are needed, they should just be defined
in the schema with their own element/attribute definitions. They should
not be "reserved" uses of the <DATA> element.  We just don't understand
the desire to do it this way. Having explicitly defined elements also
allows for more flexible datayping.

[PH] this has been extensively discussed. And we opted for the name
value pair approach. This mean that all elements in Data can be parsed
in the same manner and individually be encrypted or not. There will be a
centralized semantic registry by IANA, etc


b.      This mechanism only lets us create very simple name-value pair
extensions.  If we have some small groups of related extensions, we'd
really like to be able to define them externally in a private schema via
their own complexType definitions.  With the current method, it's going
to be very messy to add groups of extensions or extensions that have
more complex data values.

[PH] why do you say that, the name could be also be a namespace for an
wholly encrypted or base64 encoded XML sub node. I see your point though
in terms of parsing here. Could you give me an example of what you had
in mind since we have considered quite a few use cases and not come
across the requirement for grouped extensions.


c.       It is also a pain for implementers to deal with the limitation
of the data typing available for unencrypted <Data> elements.  For
example, for a SecurID token with a display interval of 60 seconds, I
cannot simply use an xml schema-defined datatype of xs:integer with a
value of "60".  I have to Base64-encode the big-endian 2-byte binary
value for 60 seconds (and then decode it on the receiving end). Why is
this necessary?  I could define such an item with a single XML element,
but here I need 3 or 4.

[PH] using xs:string for plainvalue was discussed during the last IETF
meeting (I personally am in favor of it) but Sean Turner and the rest of
the people did not see much value in it. If we use string we will need
to deice for specific data elements what the encoding rules are. For
example do we say for 8 byte unsigned int to encode just string e.g.
'60' or leading 0 examples '00000060'. I would appreciate your thoughts
on this. Also how would we encode binary data in string form base64
encoded?



d.      This approach does not produce "readable" XML since the data
values are always Base64-encoded.  That is just crazy when the data is
not sensitive in nature.  Please do not underestimate the value of being
able to look at data in an instance document and know what it is without
having to run it through a Base64 decoder! This is a major drawback.

[PH] agreed and see answer above


3.       RE: PINPolicy:

a.       If I specify a PINPolicy, I am forced to specify a PINKeyID,
which forces me to create another Key element (even if I don't have any
additional PIN policy info that I need to pass along in that Key
element). For 90% of the use cases, this referential style of
description is overkill and makes the instance document much more
complex than it needs to be. 

[PH] if you are referring to the fact that '<xs:attribute
name="PINKeyId" type="xs:string" use="required"/>' is set to required I
agree with you. We should set this to 'optional'. I do not agree with
your 90% use case analysis since the main use cases I have come across
where to transmit the initial random pin for PINPads tokens within the
same PSKC document from manufacturing to the validation server.



b.      The PINPolicy element only contains "policy" attributes for
"WrongPINtry" and "PINUsageMode" and the element is not directly
extensible.  Any extensions we need have to go in Data elements inside a
separate Key element that the PINPolicy then references.  IMO, PIN
policy info should be in the PINPolicy element, not in a separate "Key"
element! The only thing that should go in the Key element is a PIN value
that is being expressly communicated with the instance document.  That
is, a PIN value IS a key; PIN policy information IS NOT a key.

[PH] I agree we need to make PINPolicy extensible and not put stuff into
the Data elements of the PINKey. Are there any other elements that you
know of we should include now and not just as an xs:any extension?


c.       It seems to us that there are additional universally-known PIN
policy attributes that should be included in the schema.  Things such as
the PIN's maximum and minimum length and it's data type (integer,
alphanumeric).  Unless these are part of the spec, we currently are
forced to create custom Data elements for them (and put them in a
referenced Key element). BTW - Just to be clear, I am talking about the
POLICY information associated with whatever PIN a user uses with their
token.  I'm not talking about the attributes of a specific PIN value
that can be expressed in a Key element.  As an example, to express a min
and max PIN length policy, we have to create custom Data elements in a
separate Key element (and also Base64 encode the values).  I'm sorry,
but this is getting ridiculous. 

           <Key KeyId="07552252661"

             KeyAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#pin">

              <Data Name="PIN_MIN_LENGTH">

                  <PlainValue>NA==</PlainValue>

              </Data>

              <Data Name="PIN_MAX_LENGTH">

                  <PlainValue>OA==</PlainValue>

              </Data>

           </Key>

[PH] no the format and length would be in the UsageElement of the
PINKey. I had hoped Example (Section 12.2 of the spec) would make that
clear here is the XML fragment:

       <Key KeyId="07552252661" 

          KeyAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#pin">

            <Usage>

                <ResponseFormat Length="4" Format="DECIMAL"/>

            </Usage>

            <Data Name="SECRET">

                <PlainValue>MTIzNA==</PlainValue>

            </Data>

        </Key>

Notes:

a.       If I had an xs:any extension point, I could express this in 2
lines of XML in the PinPolicy element.

b.      This example doesn't include the PIN format, which would require
me to either:

                                                                     i.
Use another custom Data element 

                                                                   ii.
Include a ResponseFormat element that then requires inclusion of a
"Length" attribute. But what would the Length attribute really mean in
this case?

d.      Why isn't a PINPolicy reusable across multiple tokens (it has no
ID that can be used in a reference from a token definition).  If I want
to define a PINPolicy that applies to multiple tokens, the PINPolicy
element needs its own ID.

[PH] I see your point. If we make PINKeyId optional as in the comment
above you can have a common PINPolicy as part of the shared
KeyProperties. I believe that would serve your purpose.


e.      The "WrongPINtry" element name (in PINPolicyType) is not
consistent with the other camel-case names ("try" should be "Try").

[PH] agreed, will change


f.        In general, it is undesirable to create abbreviations such as
"InAlgo" (in PINUsageMode) to be used as XML keywords. To stay
consistent with "Local" and "Prepend", I would strongly suggest
something like "Embed" or "Algorithmic".
[PH[ we had Embed before and people got confused by the meaning. So
maybe Algorithmic is a better choice, that is why I tried to express the
use of the PIN in the algorithm as InAlgo. I do not feel very strong
about it. Maybe we can have a vote


4.       The use of "ResponseFormat" for describing a PIN is very
confusing.  The spec defines ResponseFormat as follows "The
ResponseFormat element defines the characteristics of the result of a
computation.  This defines the format of the OTP or of the response to a
challenge." A PIN is not the result of a "computation", nor is it a
response to a challenge.  It seems quite odd to use this Key construct
for a PIN. I think that either another usage type should be defined or
the ResponseFormat definition should be changed to also reflect its use
for describing a PIN.
[PH] Yes I think we need to change the description. I am getting a lot
of push back to include PIN requirements in the spec so I tried to
convince people that tit was a good idea without having to introduce to
many new schema types. Here you say it is odd to use the Key element for
the PIN value but above you agree that a PIN IS a Key. So I would keep
it in the Key element buy change description.

 

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