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Re: [kitten] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-howard-gss-sanon-00.txt

Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> Sat, 04 April 2020 11:19 UTC

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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Luke Howard <lukeh=40padl.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" <kitten@ietf.org>
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Date: Sat, 04 Apr 2020 13:18:44 +0200
In-Reply-To: <03F73286-C983-44C6-B10D-7E826AE2C609@padl.com> (Luke Howard's message of "Tue, 31 Mar 2020 13:28:11 +1100")
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-howard-gss-sanon-00.txt
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Luke Howard <lukeh=40padl.com@dmarc.ietf.org> writes:

> Hi everybody,
>
> Below is a specification for a simple anonymous mechanism based on
> curve25519 that does not authenticate either initiator or acceptor.

Interesting!  When would this be useful in SASL?  GS2 requires that the
mechanism supports mutual authentication, so while I definitely see
value in having this as a GSS-API mechanism I don't understand when it
would provide value for a SASL application, and how it would actually
work in GS2.

/Simon

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