Re: [kitten] New draft of https://tools.ietf.org/htmdraft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth

Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com> Mon, 11 July 2011 06:46 UTC

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Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2011 00:46:12 -0600
From: Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] New draft of https://tools.ietf.org/htmdraft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth
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On 07/ 7/11 12:52 PM, William J. Mills wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I've posted a new draft.  I believe there is one open issue, and that 
> is whether we're going to include text defining how Tunneled HTTP 
> authentication (started as OAuth) works with GSS-API. I am coming more 
> and more to the opinion that the GSS-API definition is going to be 
> very auth mechanism specific.  This draft only defines what SASL needs 
> currently, which is user auth.  GSS-API has message integrity as well, 
> and possibly other things that can be mapped into HTTP auth schemes, 
> and I think it's going to be  required that the auth schemes define 
> their capabilities and GSS_API mappings.
>
> The draft also fixes the channel binding text, not tls-unique 
> specific. Also defining how the CB data is properly generated.
>
> Subject to the open issue above (which could be significant) I think 
> this is close to a last call.
>
> Does this draft need some discussion time in Quebec?  If so I'll need 
> to make travel plans.

Of course it is always helpful to be there, but is not a requirement.  
There are a number of ways that we have joined remote participants to 
the sessions in the past; WebEx, Skype, jabber, chair, co-author, etc.  
However, is it possible that we can resolve the open issue before the 
session?

Shawn.
--
>
>
>     Meta-Data from the Draft
>
> Document 	draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth
> [View first two pages] 
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/submit/status/33695/a4fa263fb7371aecddccdc6674d408d9/#> 
>
>
>     * [Txt version ]
>       <http://www.ietf.org/staging/draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth-03.txt>
>     * [Pdf version ]
>       <http://www.ietf.org/staging/draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth-03.pdf>
>     * [Xml version ]
>       <http://www.ietf.org/staging/draft-mills-kitten-sasl-oauth-03.xml>
>
> Revision 	03
> WG 	Individual Submission
> Document date 	2011-07-01
> Submission date 	2011-07-02
> Title 	Tunneled HTTP Authentication For SASL
> Author information
> Author 1 	William Mills <wmills@yahoo-inc.com>
> Author 2 	Tim Showalter <timshow@yahoo-inc.com>
> Author 3 	Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
> Abstract 	Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a 
> framework for
> providing authentication and data security services in connection-
> oriented protocols via replaceable mechanisms. OAuth is a protocol
> framework for delegated HTTP authentication and thereby provides a
> method for clients to access a protected resource on behalf of a
> resource owner.
>
> This document defines the use of HTTP authentication over SASL, and
> additionally defines authorization and token issuing endpoint
> discovery. Thereby, it enables schemes defined within the OAuth
> framework for non-HTTP-based application protocols.
>
> A significant benefit of OAuth for usage in clients that usually
> store passwords is storing tokens instead of passwords. This is much
> lower risk since tokens can be more limited in scope of access and
> can be managed and revoked separately from the user credential
> (password).
> Pages 	24
>
>
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