Re: [L1vpn] Your Discusses and Comments on draft-ietf-l1vpn-bgp-auto-discovery-04.txt

Hi Adrian,

I've cleared my discuss.

Best regards,
Pasi 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Adrian Farrel [mailto:adrian@olddog.co.uk] 
> Sent: 14 May, 2008 21:17
> To: dward@cisco.com; Eronen Pasi (Nokia-NRC/Helsinki); 
> tim.polk@nist.gov
> Cc: Hamid Ould-Brahim; takeda.tomonori@lab.ntt.co.jp; l1vpn@ietf.org
> Subject: Your Discusses and Comments on 
> draft-ietf-l1vpn-bgp-auto-discovery-04.txt
> 
> Hi,
> 
> The editor has made a new version of this draft based on your 
> issues and the 
> subsequent email exchanges.
> 
> > 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-l1vpn-bgp-auto-
> discovery-05.txt
> 
> We hope that the changes (summarised below alongside your 
> coments) address 
> your points and you can clear your Discusses.
> 
> Thanks,
> Adrian
> 
> ===
> > Pasi Eronen:
> >
> > Discuss [2008-05-05]:
> > Process comment: Sandy Murphy's SecDir review needs a response.
> >
> > As noted in Sandy Murphy's SecDir review, this document seems to
> > expand the L1VPN concept significantly beyond the scope of RFC 4847
> > and draft-ietf-l1vpn-applicability-basic-mode, both of which
> > explicitly rule out inter-as/inter-provider L1VPNs.  Expanding the
> > scope of inter-AS/inter-provider VPNs makes the assumption about
> > transitive trust of all BGP speakers rather dubious.
> 
> The I-D has been updated to make clear that 
> inter-AS/inter-provider are out 
> of scope. The following paragraph has been added to the end 
> of Section 2.
> 
>    Although multi-AS L1VPNs are currently out of scope for the Basic
>    Mode, the mechanisms defined in this document appear to be easily
>    applicable to a multi-AS scenario should such a need arise in the
>    future. At that time additional work may be required to examine
>    various aspects including security.
> 
> ===
> > Pasi Eronen:
> >
> > Comment [2008-05-05]:
> > Sandy's SecDir review also identified a number of places that would
> > benefit from some clarification of the text, and provided editorial
> > comments that should be taken into acccount.
> 
> We believe these have been picked up, discussed with Sandy as 
> necessary, and 
> fixed in the new I-D.
> 
> ===
> > Tim Polk:
> >
> > Comment [2008-05-08]:
> > Sandy Murphy has asked what happens if the basic security assumption
> > does not hold.
> >
> > Given the importance of the basic trust assumption - all 
> the participants
> > are trustworthy, and trust is transitive - it would also be 
> nice if the
> > security considerations noted *why* the wg feels this is a 
> reasonable
> > assumption.  (I assume it is based on the fact that all the 
> peers are
> > members of the same provider network?)
> 
> This is fixed by a simple addition right at the end of 
> Section 6. This 
> points out that the restriction of the technique to a single provider 
> network means that the trust model is much more applicable.
> 
> 
> 
> 
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