[Last-Call] Re: [IPsec] Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention-05.txt> (Downgrade Prevention for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)) to Proposed Standard

[Songbo Bu <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

I reviewed draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention-05, in particular
the changes around the authentication-failure path for detecting modified
IKE_SA_INIT messages.

The -05 text now makes clear that the mechanism does not introduce a
separate downgrade-detection procedure. Instead, the additional
initial-exchange data is included in the IKEv2 authentication calculation,
and an implementation is not expected to distinguish that failure from
other authentication failures.

That addresses the point I raised during the WG/AD-review discussion. I
support publication as Proposed Standard.

Best,
Songbo Bu

On Fri, 29 May 2026 08:35:37 -0700, The IESG [e-mail] wrote:

The IESG has received a request from the IP Security Maintenance and
Extensions WG (ipsecme) to consider the following document: - ‘Downgrade
Prevention for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)’
as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
[e-mail] mailing lists by 2026-06-12. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to [e-mail] instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract

This document describes an extension to the Internet Key Exchange
protocol version 2 (IKEv2) that prevents particular downgrade attacks
on this protocol by having the peers confirm they have participated
in the same conversation.

This document updates RFC 7296.

The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention/

No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

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