[Last-Call] Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26.txt> (Applicability Statement for IETF Core Email Protocols) to Proposed Standard

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Tue, 06 January 2026 15:12 UTC

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Date: Wed, 07 Jan 2026 02:12:45 +1100
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: [Last-Call] Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26.txt> (Applicability Statement for IETF Core Email Protocols) to Proposed Standard
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On Tue, Jan 06, 2026 at 06:18:05AM -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> I agree with this. Moreover, the current draft actually says you shouldn't
> even *make* an SMTP implementation that doesn't accept plaintext
> email I don't think that's reasonable.

Well, as an MTA operator and email user, I wouldn't choose an MTA
implementation that can't support cleartext.  And I routinely advise
others to make a similar choice, many listen, a few do not.

STARTTLS is enabled on my MTA, I publish working DANE TlSA records, I
want senders to use TLS and to authenticate the connection, but I don't
want to slam the door shut on those who for some reason can't use TLS,
or want to report a problem doing it to the postmaser address.

And I don't see a problem here that the IETF needs to solve.  Giving MTA
operators a choice has worked very well.  Some security remains better than
none <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7435>.  A versatile MTA
allows users to choose a variety if TLS policies inbound and outbound.

We've provided the means, the operators get to decide what to do, we
don't need to patronise them.  Nobody is stopping operators who want to
only accept mail over TLS from making that choice (wisely or otherwise).

Transport security is sometimes just not the most important concern, it
can be a "nice to have", available and used almost universally,
providing "herd immunity", without setting the bar too high.

Postfix 3.11 will have REQUIRETLS support, already has DANE support, and
flexible outbound and inbound TLS policies.  These are features designed
to give operators practical choices, normative RFC requirements don't
enter into it.

-- 
    Viktor.  🇺🇦 Слава Україні!