[Last-Call] Re: [Ntp] Re: draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-15 ietf last call Genart review
Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org> Thu, 08 January 2026 06:11 UTC
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To: Hal Murray <halmurray+ietf@sonic.net>, Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
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From: Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>
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Subject: [Last-Call] Re: [Ntp] Re: draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-15 ietf last call Genart review
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On 1/7/2026 8:15 PM, Hal Murray wrote:
>
> [I'm answering your questions, not commenting on the text in the draft.]
>
>> I think this needs some clarification. Because, AFAIK NTP and NTS does
>> not require the client to have prior knowledge of the time either, right?
>
> NTP works fine without any prior knowledge of time. It is not secure.
Is that true?
What's wrong with private key authentication?
> NTS uses TLS. TLS uses certificates. Certificates have not-before and
> not-after times.
But one can only rely on not-{before,after} if one knows what time it is.
> NTS as currently deployed piggybacks on the web certificate
> infrastructure. Standard software update procedres keep the root
> certificates up to date.
Are you suggesting that a bad actor could not provide any attack vectors
here?
> Certificates from Lets Encrypt have 90 day lifetimes. I think you get a
> year or two if you pay for certificates. I've heard that there is work to
> reduce lifetimes. I'm not familiar with the details. I think the idea is
> to automate updating certificates so updating one is not a hassle, then we
> can phase in shorter lifetimes which will reduce the damage if a private
> key gets compromised.
>
> My nasty case for getting time without any prior knowledge of time is a
> spare gizmo that has been sitting on the shelf for a dozen years.
>
> NTS could get started without knowing time if we use self signed certificates with a long lifetime. But then we have to distribute their public keys. (as well as run long lifetime servers.)
How do you *know* that the remote server is offering good time in this case?
> Roughtime has long lifetime keys. If it gets packaged cleanly, people using NTS won't have to worry about getting started without knowing the time and people running NTS servers won't have to worry about self signed certificates.
>
>
> Note that in addition to long lifetime keys/certificates, you also need long lifetime IP Addresses. DNSSEC needs time.
Trustable DNS relies on reasonably accurate time.
> ---------
>
>
>> Why does the protocol only allow to obtain a rough idea of the current
>> time, instead of a more precise time?
>
> Because good time isn't needed and if you don't promise good time you don't have to spend any effort discussing how good it is or trying to make it better.
As presented, what is the significant difference between "rough" and
"more precise" time that makes a difference around whether or not a
certificate's not-{before,after} time cam be relied on?
> ---------
>
>> It does provide proof that the response was issued after the server
>> received the request, but AFAIU it does not provide any proof regarding
>> when the timestamp was issued.
>
> The timestamp came from the server. You have to trust the server.
> (If not, why are you using it?)
How do you know a bad actor isn't spoofing the trustable server?
--
Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>
NTP Project Lead. The NTP Project is part of
https://www.nwtime.org/ - be a member!
- [Last-Call] draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-15 ietf last… Christer Holmberg via Datatracker
- [Last-Call] Re: [Ntp] draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-15… Hal Murray
- [Last-Call] Re: [Ntp] Re: draft-ietf-ntp-roughtim… Harlan Stenn
- [Last-Call] Re: [Ntp] draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-15… Christer Holmberg
- [Last-Call] Re: [Ntp] draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-15… Hal Murray