Re: [Last-Call] [v6ops] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops-05

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Sat, 20 February 2021 20:27 UTC

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To: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Cc: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>, Gorry Fairhurst <gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk>, IPv6 Operations <v6ops@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops.all@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, tsv-art@ietf.org, Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
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From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
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Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 20:26:51 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Last-Call] [v6ops] Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops-05
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Hi Tom,

Tom Herbert wrote on 20/02/2021 19:46:
> Give that these classes are documented, then the obvious question is
> what are the common limits that should work. RFC8504 does this for
> some of the limits that are more apropos to the host; hopefully, an
> outcome of this draft will define some practical limits for routers
> and set some expectations about what should work.

Definitely that would be good material for a future ID.  This aim of 
this draft is:

>    This document summarizes the operational implications of IPv6
>    extension headers specified in the IPv6 protocol specification
>    (RFC8200), and attempts to analyze reasons why packets with IPv6
>    extension headers are often dropped in the public Internet.

I'd love to see some future discussion about reasonable lower limits 
that we could expect manufacturers and software authors to aim towards, 
but it's out of scope for this draft.

Nick