[Last-Call] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-10

Bo Wu via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Mon, 20 March 2023 11:21 UTC

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From: Bo Wu via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 04:21:25 -0700
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Subject: [Last-Call] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-10
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Reviewer: Bo Wu
Review result: Ready

Hi,

I am the assigned ops reviewer. Thanks for the document.

This is a well written document that describes the background of the 3GPP
issues, the two Forward Secrecy extensions, and the impact on the existing
EAP-AKA' messages.

This document defines the EAP-AKA’(RFC 9048) Forward Secrecy extension to
address the issue of compromised shared secrets stored on 3GPP 5G networks
Smart Cards due to supply chain attacks.

With only IETF technical background, it seems more readable if UICC, HSS can
expand on the first-time use.

Thanks,
Bo Wu