[Last-Call] Re: [Ntp] draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-15 ietf last call Genart review

Hal Murray <halmurray+ietf@sonic.net> Thu, 08 January 2026 04:15 UTC

Return-Path: <halmurray+ietf@sonic.net>
X-Original-To: last-call@mail2.ietf.org
Delivered-To: last-call@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BBE6AA48D7B5; Wed, 7 Jan 2026 20:15:54 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at ietf.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 0.602
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.602 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_SAFE_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=sonic.net
Received: from mail2.ietf.org ([166.84.6.31]) by localhost (mail2.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RapR1XTzm92a; Wed, 7 Jan 2026 20:15:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from d.mail.sonic.net (d.mail.sonic.net [64.142.111.50]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9FFAAA48D7AD; Wed, 7 Jan 2026 20:15:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from 107-137-68-211.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net (107-137-68-135.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [107.137.68.135]) (authenticated bits=0) by d.mail.sonic.net (8.16.1/8.16.1) with ESMTPSA id 6084Fgh7025263 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128 verify=NOT); Wed, 7 Jan 2026 20:15:42 -0800
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sonic.net; s=net23; t=1767845743; bh=batQL4iVNkhp+32aUCli5IwEb7w7ZjxHkvo/QZHDyys=; h=To:From:Subject:Mime-Version:Date:Message-Id:From:Subject; b=qnnRgFttdW+bz3jRyHfKcTppwMEAvGbluQ+fXPxUP98YN52alBMePnkiSJI6A8VD4 21Jc3vscxeD55W7wce08EPvVBXezjTLpySa63FcDFqfCuRTSA4q1urpfD7eKfkoLic MUvrzfLpcCYIRoWShop4P0Z8PxLT73OXJVS5it+yp3PalFV+v/O5sgZcrUWaQdLGPb Op+qh8joALTDi5SysCl7TCc9Mxh3qR5o85O1Ic3D3RaVQ0Y4G70hs7mW9UzEkQyq8v qkMdi5hjwGJGeBD2PL4/fRKEX0lEVAuD2GCIJJ6XenscgViPNjAg242SgyOZ+sqnPO Wv/H1MK96s3jw==
Received: from hgm-4 (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by 107-137-68-211.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 650F862003D; Wed, 07 Jan 2026 20:15:42 -0800 (PST)
X-Mailer: exmh version 2.9.0 11/07/2018 with nmh-1.8
To: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
From: Hal Murray <halmurray+ietf@sonic.net>
In-Reply-To: Message from Christer Holmberg via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> of "Wed, 07 Jan 2026 02:58:02 -0800." <176778348274.3822268.17430677077923159290@dt-datatracker-5656579b89-p6k4r>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Date: Wed, 07 Jan 2026 20:15:42 -0800
Message-Id: <20260108041542.650F862003D@107-137-68-211.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net>
X-Sonic-CAuth: UmFuZG9tSVY7R4wA3cKqPX8wlNbkMnfJr/rwjjDTGu5arnSM1s0Lj2VuaCiuVw5Kg0X4jSQUyyQ3CrLO9kEXJrpAl14YR5hZMBV4HuEHnqg=
X-Sonic-ID: C;CrmPskjs8BGcYbo7kIO7Ng== M;lCmfskjs8BGcYbo7kIO7Ng==
X-Sonic-Spam-Details: -1.5/5.0 by cerberusd
Message-ID-Hash: 2MLHHDJWYLIWXF2HAPI7OKWPN4L45M7X
X-Message-ID-Hash: 2MLHHDJWYLIWXF2HAPI7OKWPN4L45M7X
X-MailFrom: halmurray+ietf@sonic.net
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: gen-art@ietf.org, draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime.all@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, ntp@ietf.org, Hal Murray <halmurray+ietf@sonic.net>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [Last-Call] Re: [Ntp] draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-15 ietf last call Genart review
List-Id: IETF Last Calls <last-call.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/last-call/tCWzj0vGowUeNfC6ioO8VUtUGPM>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/last-call>
List-Help: <mailto:last-call-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:last-call-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:last-call@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:last-call-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:last-call-leave@ietf.org>

[I'm answering your questions, not commenting on the text in the draft.]

> I think this needs some clarification. Because, AFAIK NTP and NTS does
> not require the client to have prior knowledge of the time either, right?

NTP works fine without any prior knowledge of time.  It is not secure.

NTS uses TLS.  TLS uses certificates.  Certificates have not-before and 
not-after times.

NTS as currently deployed piggybacks on the web certificate 
infrastructure.  Standard software update procedres keep the root 
certificates up to date.

Certificates from Lets Encrypt have 90 day lifetimes.  I think you get a 
year or two if you pay for certificates.  I've heard that there is work to 
reduce lifetimes.  I'm not familiar with the details.  I think the idea is 
to automate updating certificates so updating one is not a hassle, then we 
can phase in shorter lifetimes which will reduce the damage if a private 
key gets compromised.

My nasty case for getting time without any prior knowledge of time is a 
spare gizmo that has been sitting on the shelf for a dozen years.

NTS could get started without knowing time if we use self signed certificates with a long lifetime.  But then we have to distribute their public keys.  (as well as run long lifetime servers.)


Roughtime has long lifetime keys.  If it gets packaged cleanly, people using NTS won't have to worry about getting started without knowing the time and people running NTS servers won't have to worry about self signed certificates.


Note that in addition to long lifetime keys/certificates, you also need long lifetime IP Addresses.  DNSSEC needs time.

---------


> Why does the protocol only allow to obtain a rough idea of the current
> time, instead of a more precise time? 

Because good time isn't needed and if you don't promise good time you don't have to spend any effort discussing how good it is or trying to make it better.

---------

> It does provide proof that the response was issued after the server
> received the request, but AFAIU it does not provide any proof regarding
> when the timestamp was issued. 

The timestamp came from the server.  You have to trust the server.
(If not, why are you using it?)



-- 
These are my opinions.  I hate spam.