[Lsr] Martin Duke's Discuss on draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-reverse-metric-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Martin Duke via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-reverse-metric-08: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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I hope this is a quick one.

A naive reading of Sec 2.2 implies that a router could generate reverse-metric
TLVs quite rapidly, triggering a storm of TLVs from a potentially large number
of neighbors. Each reverse metric advertisement generates N LSAs, increasing
the amplification of any sort of misconfiguration or misbehavior far more than
a traditional LSAs that is updated too often.

At the very least, this ought to come up in security considerations, but I
wonder if applying some sort of rate limit (beyond which neighbors are free to
ignore) would be a firmer way of limiting the problem. I'm flexible on the best
way forward.


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COMMENT:
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A "don't be stupid" warning in 2.2 certainly wouldn't hurt, either.