Re: [Lsr] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-lsr-yang-isis-reverse-metric-04: (with COMMENT)

Christian Hopps <chopps@chopps.org> Sat, 11 December 2021 10:00 UTC

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From: Christian Hopps <chopps@chopps.org>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, lsr-chairs@ietf.org, jgs@juniper.net, acee@cisco.com, draft-ietf-lsr-yang-isis-reverse-metric@ietf.org, lsr@ietf.org
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2021 04:43:09 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Lsr] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-lsr-yang-isis-reverse-metric-04: (with COMMENT)
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Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> writes:

> Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-lsr-yang-isis-reverse-metric-04: No Objection
>
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>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Thanks for the simple and easy-to-read document!
> My comments are pretty minor.
>
> Section 2.2
>
>      grouping reverse-metric-if-config-data {
>        description "IS-IS reverse metric config data.";
>        container reverse-metric {
>          description "IS-IS reverse metric data.";
>          uses reverse-metric-data;
>          leaf exclude-te-metric {
>            type boolean;
>            default false;
>            description
>              "If true and there is a TE metric defined for this
>               interface then do not send the TE metric sub-TLV in the
>               reverse metric TLV.";
>            reference "RFC8500, Section 3.5";
>          }
>        }
>      }
>
>      grouping tlv16-reverse-metric {
>        description "IS-IS reverse metric TLV data.";
>        container reverse-metric {
>          description "IS-IS reverse metric TLV data.";
>          uses reverse-metric-data;
>          leaf te-metric {
>            type uint32;
>            description
>              "The TE metric value from the sub-TLV if present.";
>            reference "RFC8500, Section 3.5";
>          }
>        }
>      }
>
> Please confirm that Section 3.5 of RFC 8500 is the right reference for
> both of these; I didn't really see much there that lined up well with
> these descriptions.

I've changed them to match the ones above and point to section 2.

>        container reverse-metric {
>          description "Announce a reverse metric to neighbors.";
>          uses reverse-metric-if-config-data;
>          container level-1 {
>            description
>              "Announce a reverse metric to level-1 neighbors.";
>            uses reverse-metric-if-config-data;
>          }
>          container level-2 {
>            description
>              "Announce a reverse metric to level-2 neighbors.";
>            uses reverse-metric-if-config-data;
>          }
>        }
>
> Are the interactions between the toplevel
> "reverse-metric-if-config-data" and the per-level uses of that grouping
> adequately specified by the core draft-ietf-isis-yang-isis-cfg such that
> we don't need to repeat them here?  (I think it probably is.)

Yes.

> Section 4
>
>    These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/
>    vulnerability:
>
> I think the intent of the security considerations template is that we
> specifically talk about what bad things would happen if some
> unauthorized entity was writing values to the ("config true") nodes, or
> reading values from the ("config false") nodes.  The current text here
> seems to just be listing the nodes without saying what happens if
> they're misconfigured or the contents are leaked to an unauthorized
> party.  (On first glance, it seems like the security considerations of
> RFC 8500 basically cover everything that we would need to say.  It's
> short, so we could repeat the content, or we could say that these YANG
> nodes correspond directly to the RFC 8500 functionality and the
> considerations of the functionality are described in RFC 8500.)

Added "These YANG nodes correspond directly to the RFC 8500 functionality and the security considerations of the functionality are described in RFC 8500." to text describing the nodes

> Section 5
>
> The core NETCONF/RESTCONF RFCs may not need to be classified as
> normative (we only reference them from the security considerations
> boilerplate), but there's not much harm in leaving them here.

Moved them to informative.

> Appendix A
>
> Thank you for including the examples!

NP. :)

Thanks,
Chris.

>
>
>
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k