Re: [Lurk] Cryptoanalysis of KeyLess SSL

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 04 May 2017 00:40 UTC

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 10:40:12 +1000
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To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Cc: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>, LURK BoF <lurk@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Lurk] Cryptoanalysis of KeyLess SSL
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On 4 May 2017 at 02:44, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> It's not clear to me that such a change would actually provide better
> protection of client privacy.  In particular, such an option could be
> misused by operators of malicious networks or other would-be MiTM
> attackers to force themselves into the channel that would otherwise be
> opaque to them.


I agree with DKG here.  The business of security indications is
already challenging enough.  A more thorough analysis would be
required.